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DISEASE-BRANDING AND DRUG-MONGERING:  
COULD PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROMOTIONAL 
PRACTICES RESULT IN TORT LIABILITY? 
Jason S. Cetel ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a forty-five-year-old woman who has been happily mar-
ried for fifteen years presenting to her physician with complaints of 
infrequent sexual thoughts and fantasies.
1
  After a history and physi-
cal examination, the physician diagnoses her as having low sexual de-
sire.
2
  But does she have an actual disease?  A few decades ago, this 
woman would not have had a recognizable disease, and there was no 
official diagnosis.
3
  Today, she could be diagnosed with some form of 
Female Sexual Dysfunction (FSD)
4
 or Hypoactive Sexual Desire Dis-
order (HSDD).
5
  The evolution of these symptoms into a recogniza-
 
 ∗ J.D., May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Vassar College.  
Thanks to my advisors, Professors Jordan Paradise and Kate Greenwood, my com-
ment editor, Marissa Litwin, and Amanda Brill for their constructive comments, in-
valuable advice, and support. 
 1 See Rosemary Basson, Sexual Desire and Arousal Disorders in Women, 354 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1497, 1497 (2006). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Sexual Dysfunction—Sexual Desire Disorders, Sexual Arousal Disorders, Orgasm 
Disorders, Sexual Pain Disorders, Sex Therapy, JRANK: MARRIAGE AND FAM. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://family.jrank.org/pages/1508/Sexual-Dysfunction.html (last visited Feb. 4, 
2012) (“Psychosexual disorders were listed for the first time in 1980 in the third edi-
tion of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-III), a handbook used by almost all mental health profes-
sionals.”).  Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed., 1968), and AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed., 1980), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 293 (3d rev. ed., 
1987) (containing Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder, Diagnostic Code 302.71), and 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
541 (4th ed., text rev., 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR, 2000] (same).   
 4 Ray Moynihan, The Marketing of a Disease: Female Sexual Dysfunction, 330 BRIT. 
MED. J. 192, 192 (2005), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC545000/pdf/bmj33000192.pdf. 
 5 Id.; see also DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, at 541; Basson, supra note 1, at 1498 
tbl.2.  
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ble disease occurred through a process of social construction and 
medicalization.  It is called disease-branding, and HSDD provides a 
quintessential example of this practice.
6
 
Disease-branding is the pharmaceutical advertising practice of 
transforming symptoms into disease-states and coining new clinical 
names to identify them.
7
  This practice legitimizes diseases in the eyes 
of consumer-patients as a pretext to push drug treatments on them.
8
  
The concept of disease-branding has gained heightened attention in 
the media.
9
  In October 2010, the New York Times’ resident lexicog-
 
 6 See Andrew Moseman, Skeptics of “Female Viagra” Say Drug Co’s Are “Disease Brand-
ing,” 80BEATS (June 18, 2010, 9:59 AM), 
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/80beats/2010/06/18/skeptics-of-female-viagra-
say-drug-cos-are-disease-branding/.  The creation of “Metabolic Syndrome” provides 
another example of disease branding:  
Most people may not have heard of metabolic syndrome, but that is 
likely to change. Once known mysteriously as Syndrome X, the condi-
tion, a precursor to heart disease and type 2 diabetes, is about to be 
transformed into a household name by the US pharmaceutical industry 
and its partners in the medical profession. A society dedicated to ad-
dressing the condition has been organized, a journal has been started, 
and an education campaign launched. Patients are already being tested 
for metabolic syndrome. As the trade publication Pharmaceutical Ex-
ecutive said in its January 2004 issue: “A new disease is being born.” 
Howard Wolinsky, Disease Mongering and Drug Marketing: Does the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try Manufacture Diseases as Well as Drugs?, 6 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 612, 
612 (2005) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted), available at 
http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v6/n7/pdf/7400476.pdf. 
 7 Ray Moynihan, The Merging of Marketing and Medical Science, ABC NEWS ONLINE 
(Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2996546.htm.  See gener-
ally Anne Landman, Branding Diseases to Sell Cures, PR WATCH BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010, 
12:44 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/node/9529 (“Once people are convinced they 
have a new condition, they will seek treatment on their own, and new drugs will sell 
themselves.”); Vince Parry, Branding Disease, PHARM. EXEC. (Oct. 15, 2007), 
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=465561
&pageID=1&sk=&date=. 
 8 See Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612. 
 9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Mari, New Buzzword of 2010: “Disease Branding,” BEYOND MY 
TWO CENTS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.beyondmytwocents.com/new-buzzword-of-
2010-disease-branding/; Ben Schott, Disease Branding, SCHOTT’S VOCAB (Oct. 18, 
2010, 1:30 PM), http://schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/disease-branding/. 
Comedians and pundits in the popular media have also observed this phenomenon.  
See, e.g., Bill Maher-Anti-Pharma Rant, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHXXTCc-IVg&feature=related. 
Because you see the government isn’t your nanny, they’re your dealer.  
And they subsidize illness in America.  They have to; there’s too much 
money in it.  You see, there’s no money in healthy people.  And there’s 
no money in dead people.  The money is in the middle.  People who 
are alive, sort of.  But with one or more chronic conditions that puts 
them in need of Celebrex, or Nasonex, or Valtrex, or Lunesta. . . . 
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rapher, blogging about the recent coinage of “disease-branding,” de-
fined it as the practice of “[h]yping the profile of a medical condition 
in order to sell its treatment.”
10
  In its more extreme form, critics have 
pejoratively characterized disease-branding as the practice of “trying 
to convince essentially well people that they are sick, or slightly sick 
people that they are very ill.”
11
  Disease-branding has even been re-
ferred to as “the most insidious of the various forms that medical ad-
vertising . . . and medical diagnosis can take.”
12
 
When pharmaceutical companies attempt to push drug treat-
ments on patients through disease-branding strategies such as direct-
to-consumer (DTC) advertising, they are engaging in a practice 
called “drug-mongering.”
13
  Drug-mongering is inextricably linked to 
disease-branding: it refers to the practice of persuading consumers 
that they are afflicted with the branded disease and thus require the 
advertised drug treatment.  Bioethicist Professor Dr. Carl Elliot ex-
plains this as a two-part process in which drug companies sell their 
drugs by selling the diseases they treat.
14
  Essentially, branding a dis-
ease “is to shape its public perception in order to make it more palat-
able to potential patients.”
15
  Once a disease is successfully branded, 
drug companies engage in drug-mongering by persuading consumer-
patients that they need to use the company’s drugs to treat the dis-
ease.
16
  The confluence of disease-branding and drug-mongering is 
 
[There are emerging epidemics and] a long list of ailments, which 
used to be rare and have now been mainstreamed. 
Id.  Bill Maher is correct that there is money in drug-mongering because treating 
chronic conditions is much more profitable than curing them.  The suggestion that 
the FDA, however, as the representative agency of the government, implicitly legiti-
mizes the mainstreaming of ailments through its approval process misconstrues the 
FDA’s mandate, which is to approve drugs as safe and effective for their intended 
use, not to determine what the intended use is or should be.  See infra Part II.B. 
 10 Schott, supra note 9.  
 11 Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Although the term “drug-mongering” does not seem to be used in the litera-
ture—“disease-mongering” is the preferred terminology—this Comment uses the 
concepts of  “disease-branding” and “drug-mongering” as separate practices that are 
intimately related, are complementary, and act synergistically for pharmaceutical 
promotional practices to be effective. 
 14 Carl Elliott, How to Brand a Disease—and Sell a Cure, CNN.COM (Oct. 11, 2010, 
2:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/10/11/elliott.branding.disease/ 
index.html?iref=allsearch. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (“Once a branded disease has achieved a degree of cultural legitimacy, 
there is no need to convince anyone that a drug to treat it is necessary.  It will come 
to him as his own idea.”). 
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the essence of pharmaceutical promotional practices, and these pro-
motional practices provide the context and analytical framework for 
this Comment. 
The development of HSDD demonstrates a disease-branding 
and drug-mongering strategy.
17
  According to Ray Moynihan, an in-
vestigative journalist and vocal opponent of pharmaceutical promo-
tional practices, drug companies have diligently tried to convince 
women that they need a drug to treat low libido.
18
  He notes that 
pharmaceutical companies “have helped create the measurement 
and diagnostic instruments to persuade women that their sexual dif-
ficulties deserve a medical label and treatment.”
19
 
Flibanserin is a drug that was developed to treat HSDD, and the 
drug sponsor’s briefing document, prepared for the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Com-
mittee
20
 meeting regarding flibanserin’s New Drug Application 
(NDA), reported positive safety and efficacy data.
21
  But the FDA’s 
 
 17 Moseman, supra note 6 (“This is really a classic case of disease branding. . . . 
The messages are aimed at medicalizing normal conditions, and also preying on the 
insecurity of both the clinician and the patient.” (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted)).  Contra Nancy Zielinski, Treatments Needed to Treat Female Sexual Dys-
function Experts Say, EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 10, 2011, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.examiner.com/sexual-health-in-grand-rapids/treatments-needed-to-
treat-female-sexual-dysfunction-experts-say?cid=parsely#parsely (noting that ninety 
percent of doctors surveyed accept the need for an FDA-approved treatment). 
 18 Kathleen Blanchard, Female Sexual Dysfunction: Are Drug Companies Manufactur-
ing a Disease?, EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 2, 2010, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.examiner.com/women-s-health-in-national/female-sexual-dysfunction-
are-drug-companies-manufacturing-a-disease. 
 19 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20 An advisory committee is composed of outside scientific and medical experts as 
well as industry, consumer, and patient representatives who provide the FDA with 
independent advice on regulatory decisions.  See Questions and Answers Regarding Advi-
sory Committee Membership, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/ 
AboutAdvisoryCommittees/CommitteeMembership/ucm117646.htm (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2012); see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC 
AND FDA STAFF ON CONVENING ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETINGS 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM125651. 
pdf (“FDA’s advisory committees provide independent expert advice to the agency 
on a range of complex scientific, technical, and policy issues.  An advisory committee 
meeting also provides a forum for a public hearing on important matters.  Although 
advisory committees provide recommendations to FDA, FDA makes the final deci-
sions.”). 
 21 BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM, FLIBANSERIN BRIEFING DOCUMENT 22 (2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials
/Drugs/ReproductiveHealthDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM215438.pdf.  
Flibanserin therapy, at the recommended dosing regimen . . . resulted 
in statistically significant and clinically relevant improvements of the 
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Advisory Committee unanimously rejected flibanserin,
22
 and the 
sponsor discontinued seeking approval before the FDA could take fi-
nal regulatory action on the NDA.
23
  Although HSDD has evolved into 
a recognized disease, its treatment has failed to co-evolve—there are 
currently no FDA-approved pharmaceutical options available to treat 
this condition.
24
  Without a drug to sell, drug companies are unable 
 
hallmark symptoms of HSDD in premenopausal women based on pa-
tient-based assessments of sexual desire, sexual distress, sexual activity, 
sexual function, and overall patient benefit.  In general, flibanserin is 
well-tolerated as the AEs reported during the development program 
were non-serious and mild in severity.  Currently, women face extreme-
ly limited options when seeking help for HSDD.  It is important that 
women suffering from HSDD and their health care providers have an 
approved treatment option available to them. As the first pharmacolog-
ic therapy for HSDD in premenopausal women, if approved, 
Flibanserin would appreciably expand the HSDD treatment armamen-
tarium and the choices available to women. 
Id.; see also Press Release, Boehringer Ingelheim, Women with Hypoactive Sexual De-
sire Disorder (HSDD) Report That Flibanserin Increased Their Sexual Desire and 
Reduced Associated Distress (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.boehringer-
ingelheim.com/news/news_releases/press_releases/2010/19_may_2010.html.  
 22 Emily P. Walker, Company Halts “Female Viagra” Development, MEDPAGE TODAY 
(Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.medpagetoday.com/ProductAlert/Prescriptions/22697 
(“The committee also voted 11 to 0 that the company failed to demonstrate that the 
benefits of flibanserin outweigh the risks, which include fainting, accidental injury, 
insomnia, and fatigue.”); see also Duff Wilson, Drug for Sexual Desire Disorder Opposed by 
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010, at B3; “Female Viagra” Falls Short, FDA Says, 
MSNBC.COM (June 16, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37727629/; 
David W. Freeman, “Female Viagra” a Flop, Says FDA Panel, CBS NEWS (June 17, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/17/health/main6591413.shtml. 
 23 Press Release, Boehringer Ingelheim, Following Regulatory Feedback 
Boehringer Ingelheim Decides to Discontinue Flibanserin Development (Oct. 8, 
2010), available at http://www.boehringer-
ingelheim.com/news/news_releases/press_releases/2010/08_october_2010_fliba.ht
ml. 
Boehringer Ingelheim announced today the decision to discontinue 
the development of its investigational compound flibanserin for the 
treatment of Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD).  The compa-
ny continues to believe in the value that flibanserin would have for 
women suffering with HSDD, a significant and recognized medical 
condition which impacts the lives of many women around the world. 
Id.; Boehringer Pulls the Plug on “Pink Viagra,” REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2010, 11:55 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/08/us-boehringer-flibanserin-
idUSTRE6970TN20101008. 
 24 Jennifer Corbett Dooren, FDA Questions Safety of “Female Viagra,” WALL ST. J., 
June 17, 2010, at D2 [hereinafter Dooren, FDA Questions]; Jennifer Corbett Dooren, 
Panel Rejects “Pink Viagra” to Boost Female Libido, WALL ST. J (June 18, 2010, 5:50 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704122904575315140487376022.h
tml; cf. Basson, supra note 1, at 1502–03 tbl.4 (noting the absence of FDA-approved 
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to engage in drug-mongering, but flibanserin still remains one of the 
most recent attempts at disease-branding.
25
  Despite the lack of an 
FDA-approved drug to treat HSDD, the controversy surrounding the 
branding of this disease remains.
26
  Annemarie Jutel, a medical soci-
ologist, suggests that 
[i]n a society which portrays female hypersexuality as desirable, 
and where women’s tumultuous lives don’t usually result in per-
fectly timed and balanced sexual urges, it hasn’t been hard to de-
scribe low libido as abnormal in order to sell an expensive 
cure . . . . The problem is the hidden commercial interests behind 
the science . . . .  Sexuality is a complex expression of social, cul-
tural, psychological, and physiological factors and many of us 
struggle with it, without being “sick.” Don’t let the pharmaceutical 
industry tell you otherwise.
27
 
Commenting on the controversy surrounding the definition of 
HSDD, Psychiatry Professor Dr. Ronald Pies notes that “in weighing 
this spectrum of divergent views, it’s clear that much turns on our 
philosophical understanding of terms such as ‘disease,’ ‘disorder,’ 
 
medications, but the possibility of off-label uses).  In a hypothetical case study of  a 
woman with low sexual desire, Dr. Basson stated that 
[o]n the basis of clinical experience and limited data on outcomes, I 
would recommend a combination of cognitive behavioral therapy and 
sex therapy . . . .  Any apparent interpersonal problems should be ad-
dressed before further sexual therapy is pursued.  At the present time, I 
would not recommend any pharmacologic therapy, pending the avail-
ability of more (and longer-term) data in support of such treatment. 
Id. at 1504–05. 
 25 See Moseman, supra note 6; Press Release, BioSante Pharmaceuticals Reports 
Positive LibiGel® Safety Data Review for Phase III Program (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.biosantepharma.com/News-Releases.php?ID=020912 (describing 
LibiGel as a drug “in development for the treatment of female sexual dysfunction 
(FSD), specifically, hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD) in menopausal wom-
en.”). 
 26 See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 4; Leonore Tiefer, Female Sexual Dysfunction: A 
Case Study of Disease Mongering and Activist Resistance, 3 PLOS MED. 436, 436 (2006), 
available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/ 
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030178; Natasha Singer, Sex and the Single 
Drug, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at BU3; Duff Wilson, Push to Market Pill Stirs Debate on 
Sexual Desire, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A1; Annemarie Jutel, Why the Cure for Flag-
ging Female Libido is Hard to Swallow, BRISBANE TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009), 
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/lifestyle/diet-and-fitness/why-the-cure-for-
flagging-female-libido-is-hard-to-swallow-20091207-ketm.html; Ray Moynihan, Sex 
Drugs for Women Don’t Seem to Be Working, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 1, 2010), 
http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2998870.htm; Susan Seligson, Female Li-
bido Pill Leaves Ethicist Cold, BU TODAY ONLINE (June 25, 2010), 
http://www.bu.edu/today/node/11179.  
 27 Jutel, supra note 26. 
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‘dysfunction,’ and ‘medical condition.’”
28
  The controversy essentially 
encompasses the cultural, social, medical, and (in this Comment) le-
gal significance of disease-branding and drug-mongering—their im-
pact on regulatory decision-making, interaction with statutory rules, 
and other potential legal ramifications. 
Disease-branding and drug-mongering are the pharmaceutical 
promotional practices of “selling sickness” by widening the bounda-
ries of diagnosable illnesses in order to expand the market for drug 
treatments.
29
  They are “a process that encourages the conversion of 
socially created anxiety into medical diagnoses suitable for pharmaco-
logical treatment.”
30
  Critics argue that these promotional practices 
“turn[] healthy people into patients, waste[] precious resources, and 
cause[] iatrogenic harm.”
31
 
Despite the growing attention to disease-branding and drug-
mongering in the public health, sociology-of-health, economic, and 
advertising fields, there appears to be a critical abstinence in the legal 
realm.  There is a dearth of legal literature addressing these practices 
as a unique phenomenon or evaluating the regulatory issues and lia-
bility implications for the pharmaceutical industry that stem from 
them.
32
  This Comment concedes that opposition to the phenomena 
of disease-branding and drug-mongering, which critics of the phar-
maceutical industry and of the FDA have expounded, is valid from a 
sociology-of-health perspective.  But such criticism is inappropriate 
 
 28 Ronald W. Pies, FDA Lacks Desire for Flibanserin—but Does Hypoactive Sexual Desire 
Disorder Even Exist?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Aug. 4, 2010),  
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/sexual-disorders/content/article/10168/1632801.  
For a discussion of how the term “disease” is defined, see infra Part III.B. 
 29 Ray Moynihan & David Henry, The Fight Against Disease Mongering: Generating 
Knowledge for Action, 3 PLOS MED. 425, 425 (2006), available at 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.00
30191. 
 30 Tiefer, supra note 26, at 436. 
 31 Moynihan & Henry, supra note 29, at 425.  An iatrogenic injury is one “induced 
inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical treatment or diagnostic proce-
dures.” Iatrogenic Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MED. DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/iatrogenic (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).    
 32 See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 241, 242 (1999) (“Little or no attention is paid to the ways in which 
medical professionals react to the external pressures emanating from, or mediated 
by, legal institutions with regard to defining and diagnosing disease conditions.”).  A 
LexisNexis search of the “U.S. Law Reviews and Journals, Combined” database re-
veals zero hits for “drug mongering,” zero hits for “disease branding,” and sixteen 
hits for “disease mongering” (the majority of which are simply quoting works by Ray 
Moynihan).   
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from a regulatory point of view.  This Comment argues that the prac-
tices of disease-branding and drug-mongering comply with the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”)
33
 and its accompanying regula-
tions addressing prescription drug advertising.
34
  Because this Com-
ment concludes that critics are unlikely to succeed in challenging 
these practices from an administrative-law perspective, it will consider 
the viability of a legal cause of action against such practices, using the 
common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(IIED), negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and medi-
cal malpractice.  Upon analyzing these litigation strategies, the 
Comment concludes that a claim for IIED, NIED, or medical mal-
practice could possibly survive a motion to dismiss and could be de-
cided on its merits.  Nevertheless, such a claim would be unlikely to 
succeed and, if it did, would ultimately be ineffective as a compre-
hensive reform measure.  Accordingly, the most successful and effec-
tive route to change these practices on a systemic level is in the legis-
lative arena.  Therefore, this Comment considers a previously 
introduced congressional bill, the Independent Drug Education and 
Outreach Act (IDEA), and proposes and evaluates possible amend-
ments to this bill that would address the negative effects of disease-
branding and drug-mongering practices.  Through medical educa-
tion strategies, such as “academic detailing” of physicians, critics can 
combat what they perceive as pervasive and insidious pharmaceutical 
promotional practices. 
Part II of this Comment examines the historical and legal devel-
opment of the FDA’s regulatory framework as well as the evolution of 
the federal drug approval process and DTC advertising of approved 
prescription drugs.  Part III discusses the sociology-of-health analyti-
cal framework and considers how the social construction and medi-
calization of disease enables disease-branding and drug-mongering.  
Part IV examines potential causes of action that critics can use to 
challenge the pharmaceutical industry in the tort arena through 
claims for IIED, NIED, and medical malpractice.  It then considers 
legislative and educational reform efforts as a prospective remedy to 
combat the negative effects of disease-branding and drug-mongering.  
Part V concludes. 
 
 33 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006). 
 34 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2011) (prescription drug advertisements). 
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II. THE HISTORY OF DRUG REGULATION AND THE CURRENT LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
A. Historical Development of the Statutory Definition of a “Drug” 
The development of a regulatory framework for approving drugs 
began in 1906,
35
 but the relevant statutory definition of “drug” was 
first amended in 1938.
36
  The legislative history of the FD&C Act re-
veals the evolution of the definition.
37
  During the congressional hear-
ings leading up to the 1938 Act, there was growing concern about the 
lack of jurisdictional reach.  The “definition for the term ‘drug’ 
fail[ed] to cover drugs invented to alter the structure or function of 
the body,”
38
 as opposed to those “substances intended to be used for 
the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease,”
39
 to which the 1906 
Act definition was limited.  The principal way in which the 1938 
amendments altered the definition of “drug” was that “[d]rugs in-
tended for diagnosing illness or for remedying underweight or over-
weight or for otherwise affecting bodily structure or function [were] 
subjected to regulation.”
40
  The 1938 amendments added § 
321(g)(3),
41
 which defined the structure/function drugs to include 
all products “which are sold to correct the function and structure of 
the body, such as obesity preparations which were not covered by the 
act.”
42
  The purpose of this broadened and inclusive definition was “to 
reach the use of fat reducers, particularly since obesity may not be a 
disease.”
43
 
 
 35 See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 
1938). 
 36 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(g), 
52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2006)). 
 37 See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT 
AND ITS AMENDMENTS (1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT]. 
 38 81 CONG. REC. 1947 (1937) (statement of Rep. Edward H. Rees), reprinted in 5 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra note 37, at 816, 816.  
 39 § 7, 34 Stat. at 769. 
 40 S. REP. NO. 75-2139, at 2 (1938), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FD&C 
ACT, supra note 37, at 300, 301. 
 41 § 201(g), 52 Stat. at 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006)). 
 42 Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 74th Cong. 29 (1935) (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn), reprinted in 3 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra note 37, at 192, 224.  At this hearing, Mr. 
Dunn was representing the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., the 
American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the National Association of 
Dog Food Manufacturers, and himself. 
 43 Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941 and S. 5 
Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 55 
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One should consider the FDA’s regulatory capacity over obesity 
drugs in order to analyze how “structure/function” drugs became 
subject to FDA regulation.  Prior to 1938, obesity drugs were outside 
the FDA’s jurisdictional scope, but now, especially within the past 
couple of years, the FDA has taken several decisive regulatory actions 
with respect to obesity drugs.  On October 8, 2010, Abbott Labs with-
drew the diet drug Meridia from the market.
44
  A week later, the FDA 
“declined to approve what would have been the first new prescription 
diet pill in more than a decade.”
45
  Shortly thereafter, the FDA reject-
ed another diet pill, called Qnexa.
46
  Dr. Ken Fujioka, Director of the 
Center for Weight Management at the Scripps Clinic in San Diego, 
commented how “[i]t looks pretty bleak out there for anyone trying 
to get a drug approval for weight loss.”
47
 
This observation would have seemed absurd to any drug manu-
facturer prior to the 1938 Act, which expanded the definition of drug 
to include structure/function drugs specifically in order to place obe-
sity drugs within its regulatory jurisdiction.
48
  Prior to 1938, obesity 
was not considered a disease and obesity drugs could only be regulat-
ed through FDA’s enforcement authority over adulteration and mis-
 
(1935) (statement of Walter G. Campbell, Chief, Food and Drug Administration) 
[hereinafter Food, Drug, and Cosmetics], reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, 
supra note 37, at 312, 370;  cf. Annemarie Jutel, Sociology of Diagnosis, A Preliminary Re-
view, 31 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 278, 292 (2009) (“Commercial interests have an im-
portant stake in highlighting overweight as a medical diagnosis, rather than a statisti-
cal deviation from normative weight.”). 
 44 Andrew Pollack, Abbott Labs Withdraws Meridia from the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
9, 2010, at B3.  
 45 Andrew Pollack, No F.D.A. Approval for New Diet Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at 
A27; see also Andrew Pollack, F.D.A Panel Urges Denial of Diet Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2010, at B1 [hereinafter Pollack, F.D.A. Panel Urges].  An FDA advisory panel  
recommended against approval of a new diet pill, the latest setback in 
efforts to develop treatments for the nation’s obesity epidemic . . . .  
The negative vote is the second setback this year in attempts to win ap-
proval for what would be the first new prescription weight-loss drug in 
more than a decade. 
Pollack, F.D.A. Panel Urges, supra. 
 46 Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Rejects Qnexa, a Third Weight-Loss Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
29, 2010, at A1.   
 47 Id.  But see Andrew Pollack, Advisory Panel Favors Approval for Weight-Loss Drug, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at B1 (noting that the advisory committee recommended 
approval of Qnexa and that the FDA is expected to decide whether to approve the 
drug by April 17, 2012). 
 48 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
CETEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  2:29 PM 
2012] COMMENT 653 
 
branding;
49
 now, because approval is required, the FDA has taken 
regulatory action on three obesity drugs in a single month, and obesi-
ty is considered not only a disease, but an epidemic.
50
 
A drug is now defined as any article intended to diagnose, cure, 
mitigate, treat, or prevent disease (“disease drug”) or any article in-
tended to affect the structure or function of the body (“struc-
ture/function drug”).
51
  The addition of structure/function drugs in-
to the regulatory scheme is relevant for the discussion of disease-
branding because it rebuts the critics’ argument that the FDA ap-
proves drugs to treat non-diseases or industry-invented ailments.
52
 
B. Regulatory Classification and Approval of a Drug 
Drugs are classified as either “new drugs” or drugs that are “gen-
erally recognized as safe and effective” (GRASE).
53
  Before a new drug 
can be marketed, the FDA requires approval of an NDA under 21 
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), of an Abbreviated New Drug Application under 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j), or through the hybrid 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) pro-
cess.
54
  GRASE drugs can be marketed without these approvals if they 
comply with an over-the-counter (OTC) drug monograph.
55
  Whether 
drugs are “disease drugs” or “structure/function drugs” is largely ir-
relevant for regulatory purposes because both must be safe and effec-
 
 49 For a discussion of how the FD&C Act’s definition of drug was amended be-
cause obesity was not considered a disease, and thus articles intended to remedy obe-
sity escaped classification and regulation, see Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 
335 (7th Cir. 1983).  For a suggestion that obesity is not a disease, see Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics, supra note 43, at 370. 
 50 Benjamin Caballero, The Global Epidemic of Obesity: An Overview, 29 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 1, 1 (2007), available at 
http://epirev.oxfordjournals.org/content/29/1/1.full.pdf. 
 51 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)–(C) (2006) (“[A drug includes] articles intended for 
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or 
other animals; and articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body of man or other animals . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 52 See infra Part II.B (discussing that the safety-and-efficacy standard of approval is 
the same for all new drugs). 
 53 § 321(p)(1)(“[New drug is a]ny drug . . . the composition of which is such that 
such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified  . . . to evaluate the safety 
and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the condition prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 54 Id. § 355(a). 
 55 21 C.F.R. § 330.1 (2011) (“[An OTC drug] is generally recognized as safe and 
effective and is not misbranded if it meets . . . each of the conditions contained in 
any applicable monograph.”).  Although there are three routes to market for new 
drugs, this Comment will focus on brand name drugs that require an NDA. 
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tive for their intended use.
56
  But whether the drug’s intended use in-
volves the treatment of certain diseases is relevant because “the status 
of a health condition as a disease potentially affects a number of [the 
FDA’s] regulatory decisions.”
57
  For example, the FDA gives accelerat-
ed approval for certain fast-track products that are “intended for the 
treatment of a serious or life-threatening condition,”
58
 priority review 
status for new drugs that treat tropical diseases,
59
 and orphan drug 
status, which includes licensing incentives,
60
 to products intended for 
the treatment of rare diseases.
61
  Outside of these specific provisions, 
however, classifying drugs into disease drugs or structure/function 
drugs is largely irrelevant because the regulatory approval process is 
the same.  Although the concept of “disease” has important applica-
tions in federal drug regulation, it is only relevant to the initial ap-
proval.
62
  The FDA’s regulation of the subsequent advertising and 
promotional practices does not consider, nor do the agency’s regula-
tors monitor, the status of the disease, as long as the advertisement is 
not misleading and the drug remains safe and effective for its intend-
ed use, whatever that use may be.
63
 
The FDA’s decision to approve a new drug “entail[s] a risk-
benefit calculation, so the perceived importance of the therapeutic 
benefit naturally will influence the Agency’s licensing judgments.”
64
  
Although this observation may be important for the initial approval 
process, once the drug is approved and marketed, categorizing prod-
ucts as disease or structure/function drugs sets up a false dichotomy 
 
 56 Compare § 355(a) (safety and efficacy requirement for new drugs), with § 330.10 
(safety-and-efficacy requirement for OTC drugs).  
 57 Noah, supra note 32, at 259. 
 58 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2006).  
 59 Id. § 360n. See generally Health Topics—Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/topics/tropical_diseases/en/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (“Tropi-
cal diseases encompass all diseases that occur solely, or principally, in the tropics.  In 
practice, the term is often taken to refer to infectious diseases that thrive in hot, hu-
mid conditions . . . .”). 
 60 Id. § 360cc(a)(2) (seven-year exclusive licensing period). 
 61 Id. § 360bb(a)(2).  
 62 Noah, supra note 32, at 242 (“[The concept of disease] helps to inform . . .  
risk-benefit calculations performed by regulatory agencies charged with licensing 
therapeutic products . . . .”). 
 63 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2011) (noting that the focus of regulating 
direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertisements is not on the disease but on en-
suring that the advertisements “include information relating to the major side effects 
and contraindications of the advertised drugs”). 
 64 Noah, supra note 32, at 261. 
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because every drug must comply with the same laws and regulations.  
Approval is based on safety and efficacy, and although the risk-
calculus might be different for drugs that treat life-threatening dis-
eases as compared to those drugs that treat less dire lifestyle prob-
lems, the regulatory approval standard is the same. 
An application for FDA approval to market a new drug requires, 
in part, a summary with a “statement identifying the pharmacologic 
class of the drug and a discussion of the scientific rationale for the 
drug, its intended use, and the potential clinical benefits of the drug 
product.”
65
  Once the application is received, the “FDA will approve 
an application after it determines that the drug meets the statutory 
standards for safety and effectiveness, manufacturing and controls, 
[and] labeling.”
66
  Through the approval of an NDA, the most rigor-
ous procedural mechanism of pharmaceutical regulation, the FDA 
acts as a gatekeeper by determining which drugs enter and exit the 
marketplace.
67
  The FDA uses this gate-keeping authority to approve a 
drug company’s NDA and regulate the flow of drugs to the market.
68
 
For example, consider Nuedexta, a drug that was recently ap-
proved to treat pseudobulbar affect (PBA),
69
 a condition “character-
ized by involuntary, sudden, and frequent episodes of laughing 
and/or crying . . . [which] typically occur out of proportion or in-
congruent to the underlying emotional state.”
70
  Critics of disease-
branding may question whether episodes of laughing and crying con-
stitute a disease—that is, whether PBA is an industry-invented disease 
that the drug sponsor created in order to provide the FDA with a ju-
risdictional hook under § 321(g)(1)(B) and thus approve Nuedexta 
as a “disease” drug.  PBA, however, is classified in the International 
Classification of Diseases as “[o]ther specified nonpsychotic mental 
 
 65 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(ii) (2011); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006). 
 66 Id. § 314.105(c); see also § 355(d). 
 67 See Daniel Carpenter, Reputation, Gatekeeping, and the Politics of Post-Marketing 
Drug Regulation, 8 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 403, 404 (2006), availa-
ble at http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2006/06/pdf/pfor1-0606.pdf. 
 68 See Daniel Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Poli-
tics, and Lessons for Policy, 23 HEALTH AFF. 52, 52 (2004), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/1/52.full.pdf+html. 
 69 Letter from Russell Katz, Dir., Div. of Neurology Prods., Office of Drug Evalua-
tion I, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Randall Kaye, Vice President, Clinical 
& Med. Affairs, Avanir Pharm. (Oct. 29, 2010), available at  
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/021879s000ltr.pdf . 
 70 NUEDEXTA, FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 3 (2010) [hereinafter, NUEDEXTA], 
available at http://www.nuedexta.com/NUEDEXTA_Full_Prescribing_Information-
1.pdf.  
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disorders following organic brain damage.”
71
  In other words, PBA ac-
companies serious disease states, such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
or multiple sclerosis,
72
 and Nuedexta treats specific functions of the 
body, the abnormality of which constitutes symptoms of these diseas-
es.
73
  Thus, although distinctions between disease drugs and struc-
ture/function drugs may be nebulous and overlapping, the status of 
the drug as one intending to treat diseases or affect bodily struc-
tures/functions is legally irrelevant because both classifications of 
drugs require proof of safety and efficacy prior to approval.
74
 
C. DTC Advertising 
Once a drug and its labeling are approved,
75
 the drug sponsor 
can promote the drug and legally use DTC advertising as part of a 
comprehensive marketing and promotional strategy.
76
  The distinct—
yet occasionally overlapping—regulatory roles of the FDA and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the marketing and advertising 
of approved drugs are important to consider.  Based on the FTC-FDA 
Memorandum of Understanding,
77
 the FDA has jurisdiction over DTC 
advertising of prescription drugs.
78
  The FDA’s rules and regulations 
control the industry, and the FDA’s Office of Prescription Drug Pro-
 
 71 Diseases Tabular List and Index, INT’L CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES-9-CM, 
http://www.icd9cm.net/ (search “Search Diseases” for “Pseudobulbar affect”; then 
follow “Pseudobulbar affect (PBA) 310.8” hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 9, 2011). 
 72 See NUEDEXTA, supra note 70, at 3. 
 73 Id. 
 74 The same analysis applies to obesity drugs, which affect the structure/function 
of the body, but also treat a disease (assuming that obesity is properly classified as a 
disease).  
 75 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006) (definition of labeling); id. § 355(b)(1)(F) (la-
beling included in NDA).  
 76 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (2011) (describing prescription drug adver-
tisements broadcasted through television). 
 77 FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed. Reg. 18539 (Sept. 16, 
1971).  See generally Thomas B. Leary, The Ongoing Dialogue Between the Food and Drug 
Administration and the Federal Trade Commission, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 209 (2004) (de-
scribing the different roles of the FDA and FTC in regulating drug labeling and ad-
vertisements, specifically in reference to DTC advertising of prescription drugs). 
 78 FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed, Reg. at 18539 (“The Food 
and Drug Administration has primary responsibility with respect to the regulation of 
the truth or falsity of prescription drug advertising.” (emphasis added)).  A drug is clas-
sified as a prescription (Rx) drug if “because of its toxicity or other potentiality for 
harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its 
use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law 
to administer such drug.”  21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
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motion (OPDP), formerly the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertis-
ing and Communications, enforces the laws.
79
 
A prescription drug DTC advertisement must present a fair bal-
ance between risks and benefits
80
 and will be deemed misbranded un-
less it contains a “major statement” describing side effects and contra-
indications.
81
  In addition, sponsors of DTC broadcast advertisements 
are required to present a brief summary of the necessary side effects 
and contraindications or, alternatively, may make an “adequate provi-
sion . . . for dissemination of the approved . . . labeling in connection 
with the broadcast presentation.”
82
  
In order to understand how these regulations govern disease-
branding and drug-mongering one must examine the FDA’s current 
interpretation of rules governing DTC broadcast advertising.  In Au-
gust 1999, the FDA issued a final guidance entitled Guidance for Indus-
try: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements (“Guidance”), which 
broadened the scope of permissible DTC advertising of pharmaceuti-
 
 79 The Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacc
o/CDER/ucm090142.htm (last updated Jan. 5, 2012). 
 80 Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertis
ing/ucm072025.htm# (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Drug Advertising: A Glos-
sary of Terms] (“[Product-claim ads must] give a ‘fair balance’ of information about 
drug risks as compared with information about drug benefits.  This means that the 
content and presentation of a drug’s most important risks must be reasonably similar 
to the content and presentation of its benefits.”). 
 81 See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006).  
In the case of an advertisement for a drug subject to section 503(b)(1) 
[prescription drug status] presented directly to consumers in television 
or radio format and stating the name of the drug and its conditions of 
use, the major statement relating to side effects and contraindications 
shall be presented in a clear, conspicuous, and neutral matter. 
 Id.; see also Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, supra note 80 (defining “major state-
ment”). 
 82 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2011). 
Advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, or 
telephone communications systems shall include information relating 
to the major side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs 
in the audio or audio and visual parts of the presentation and unless 
adequate provision is made for dissemination of the approved or per-
mitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation 
shall contain a brief summary of all necessary information related to 
side effects and contraindications. 
Id. 
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cal products to consumers.
83
  In the Guidance, the FDA expanded the 
scope of acceptable advertising practices by allowing for an alterna-
tive method of complying with the brief summary requirement in 21 
C.F.R. § 201(e)(1).
84
  The FDA concluded that the major statement of 
side effects, coupled with the adequate provision for disseminating 
approved labeling, “can provide the information disclosure required 
for [DTC] broadcast advertisements.”
85
 
The Guidance explains different approaches that satisfy the ade-
quate-provision requirement.
86
  These approaches include telling pa-
tients that physicians can provide more information, disclosing a 
website that provides access to the package labeling, and explaining 
the location of a concurrent print advertisement appearing in a pub-
lication.
87
  Applying OPDP rules and regulations to DTC advertising 
suggests that the drugs are not misbranded in violation of the FD&C 
Act because the advertisements contain a major statement with ade-
quate provisions; therefore, the disease-branding and drug-
mongering promotional strategies are fully compliant with the FD&C 
Act. 
For example, a Zelnorm DTC advertisement contains the follow-
ing major statement: “You should not take Zelnorm if you have a his-
tory of diarrhea, kidney, liver, or gall bladder disease, intestinal 
blockage or adhesions.  Tell your doctor if you get diarrhea or cramp-
ing, worsening of abdominal pain, dizziness, or headache.”
88
  The ad-
equate provision is the statement on the bottom of the screen: “See 
our ad in SHAPE magazine.”
89
  A Toviaz DTC advertisement contains 
the following major statement: “If you have certain stomach problems 
or glaucoma or cannot empty your bladder you should not take 
Toviaz.  Toviaz can cause blurred vision and drowsiness so use cau-
tion when driving or doing unsafe tasks.  The most common side ef-
 
 83 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY—CONSUMER-DIRECTED 
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm070065.pdf.  
 84 Bernard J. Garbutt III & Melinda E. Hofmann, Recent Developments in Pharma-
ceutical Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, the Learned Intermediary Defense, and Other 
Issues in the New Millennium, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 269, 274 (2003). 
 85 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 83, at 3. 
 86 Id. at 2–3. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=81IVMc5EfN0&feature=related [hereinafter Zelnorm TV Ad (2003)].   
 89 Id. 
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fects are dry mouth and constipation.”
90
  The adequate provision 
states: “See our ad in Cooking Light.”
91
  In addition, a Latisse adver-
tisement includes the following: 
If you are using prescription products for lowering eye pres-
sure . . . only use Latisse under close doctor care.  May cause eye-
lid skin darkening which may be reversible and there is potential 
for increased brown iris pigmentation which is likely perma-
nent . . . . Common side effects include itchy eyes and eye red-
ness.
92
 
The adequate provision includes a website, a telephone number, and 
the following statement at the bottom of the screen: “See our ad in 
Allure magazine.”
93
 
This is not to say that all DTC broadcast advertising is legal per 
se.  There are countless examples (beginning with the first ever DTC 
advertisement) of the FDA taking regulatory actions against pharma-
ceutical companies because of false and misleading promotional ma-
terials.
94
  In addition, the FDA has required corrective action for DTC 
broadcast advertisements that violate the balance requirement, for 
example, when an advertisement overstates benefits, expands intend-
ed uses, or minimizes side effects.
95
  Nevertheless, individual instances 
of misleading advertisements represent mere isolated tactical mistakes 
by drug companies because disease-branding and drug-mongering, as 
 
 90 CR AdWatch: Toviaz, CONSUMER REP., http://bcove.me/3232jaew (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2012) [hereinafter CR AdWatch: Toviaz]. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Latisse Brooke Shields Commercial, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqRyv8abWR4 [hereinafter Latisse Brooke Shields 
Commercial]. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See, e.g.,  Letter from Tracy L. Acker, Regulatory Review Officer, Div. of Drug 
Mktg., Adver., and Commc’n, Food and Drug Admin., to Sam Boddapati, Dir., Regu-
latory Affairs, SuperGen, Inc. (Jan. 6, 1997), available 
athttp://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformati
on/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPhar
maceuticalCompanies/UCM169185.pdf. 
 95 See, e.g., Yaz FDA Required “Clear Up,” YOUTUBE (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EO-G8O0lHq0 (Bayer’s corrective advertisement 
for Yaz made pursuant to the Warning Letter from Thomas Abrams, Dir., Div. of 
Drug Mktg., Adver., & Commc’n, to Reinhard Franzen, President & Chief Exec. Of-
ficer, Bayer HealthCare Pharm., Inc. 1 (Oct. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharm
aceuticalCompanies/ucm053993.pdf (“The TV Ads are misleading because they 
broaden the drug’s indication, overstate the efficacy of YAZ, and minimize serious 
risks associated with the use of the drug.”)). 
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a holistic, comprehensive promotional strategy, are legal from a regu-
latory perspective. 
Furthermore, the focus on the major statement to achieve com-
pliance only applies to product-claim ads.
96
  Reminder ads, which call 
attention to a brand name drug but do not include indicated uses,
97
 
and help-seeking ads or disease-awareness ads, which describe a dis-
ease but do not recommend a specific drug,
98
 are exempt from the 
provisions that require a major statement about side effects.
99
  These 
types of ads are relevant for this Comment’s later discussion about 
how DTC advertising enables disease-branding.
100
 
III. THE MEDICALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISEASE 
 The phenomena of disease medicalization and the social con-
struction of disease provide the background and theoretical frame-
work for analyzing disease-branding and drug-mongering strategies.
101
  
This framework provides a better understanding of the disease-
branding and drug-mongering strategies that the pharmaceutical in-
dustry employs because once a company defines the disease—and 
treatment of the disease in terms of the drug’s intended use—the 
drug can be legally marketed in the form of DTC advertising.
102
  Ac-
cordingly, a crucial initial inquiry is what is the definition of disease 
for the purpose of DTC advertising? 
A. Defining Disease 
One medical dictionary defines “disease” as “any deviation from 
or interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, or-
gan, or system (or combination thereof) of the body that is manifest-
ed by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology, 
 
 96 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1)(2011); Basics of Drug Ads, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertis
ing/ucm072077.htm (last updated June 24, 2009)  [hereinafter Basics of Drug Ads].  
See generally Prescription Drug Advertising, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertis
ing/default.htm (last updated May 26, 2011) (presenting examples of the different 
types of prescription drug advertisements). 
 97 § 202.1(e)(2)(i). 
 98 Basics of Drug Ads, supra note 96. 
 99 See id.; § 202.1(e)(2)(i). 
 100 See infra Part IV.B.1.c (illustrating the strategies used by various DTC drug ad-
vertisements). 
 101 See infra Part III.B. 
 102 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown.”
103
  A legal dic-
tionary defines “disease” as “a deviation from the healthy and normal 
functioning of the body.”
104
  But, “it may be absurd to decide on a 
concept of disease . . . [because] [t]here will always be ‘normal’ peo-
ple who will want treatment and ‘sick’ people who will refuse it.”
105
  
Ultimately, the concept of disease appears to be malleable,
106
 and the 
definition can change through social forces and marketing cam-
paigns.
107
  That the definition is imprecise has been confirmed 
through empirical study: 
In 1979, a study conducted by a group of Canadian researchers 
sought a unifying definition of “disease” by asking doctors to clas-
sify 34 different conditions as diseases or non-diseases. . . .  The 
study concluded with the observation  . . . [that] “there is no gen-
eral agreement on the definition of ‘a disease.’”
108
 
This Comment uses “disease” to refer to the term that the FDA 
interprets in the FD&C Act, but explains that its medico-legal defini-
tion is ambiguous and thus susceptible to exploitation by pharmaceu-
tical marketing.  Using the sociology-of-health framework, this Com-
ment exposes, explains, and clarifies the medico-legal implications of 
defining drugs and disease without reshaping the contours of the 
FD&C Act definition.  That the disease concept is malleable is signifi-
cant, not necessarily from a regulatory-approval perspective, but for 
the purposes of DTC advertising.  Because there is no precise defini-
tion, drug companies have capitalized on this ambiguity to create dis-
eases for marketing and promotional purposes.
109
  Revealing this mal-
leability clarifies the FDA’s purpose in this area—regulating the safety 
and efficacy of drugs, not the authenticity of diseases—and provides a 
 
 103 Noah, supra note 32, at 244 (quoting DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 481 (27th ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (9th ed. 2009). 
 105 P.R. Shankar & P. Subish, Disease Mongering, 48 SING. MED. J. 275, 277 (2007). 
 106 Noah, supra note 32, at 243 (“[S]cholars and physicians alike have recognized 
that diseases are socially constructed and mutable.”). 
 107 See, e,g., infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing how FSD became 
HSDD).  
 108 Eric J. Gouvin, Drunk Driving and the Alcoholic Offender: A New Approach to an Old 
Problem, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 99, 104–05 (1986) (quoting E.J.M. Cambell et al., The 
Concept of Disease, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 757, 757 (1979)). 
 109 See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Hormone Replacement Gets New Scrutiny: Finding of In-
creased Risks Prompts Federal Effort, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at A1 (“[F]ederal offi-
cials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have encour-
aged women to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevi-
table and natural set of changes to be managed.”). 
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framework for analyzing DTC promotional practices based on in-
tended use. 
B. The Medicalization of Disease 
Medicalization is the process “through which aspects of life pre-
viously outside the jurisdiction of medicine come to be construed as 
medical problems.”
110
  The sociology-of-health framework of medical-
ization explains that medicine is “understood as a social and cultural 
enterprise as well as a medico-scientific one,” such that disease is de-
fined through socio-cultural forces, rather than clear scientific con-
sensus.
111
  Essentially, disease is a social construction: “In examining 
the social meaning of illness, we focus on the role of social and cul-
tural values that shape the perception of a disease or malady.”
112
  The 
medicalization of disease is the underlying theoretical framework 
through which one can analyze how disease-branding and drug-
mongering occur in practice.  Accordingly, the medicalization con-
cept elucidates why and how the definition of disease is malleable 
and how it is both outside the scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction and 
ripe for pharmaceutical promotional exploitation. 
The study of medicalization does not belong solely to the sociol-
ogy-of-health realm because nosology—the branch of medicine con-
cerned with the classification and description of known diseases—has 
a particular and significant application in the law.  One commenta-
tor, Professor of Law Lars Noah, has noted that “no one has systemat-
ically assessed the role that the law plays in the diagnostic enter-
prise . . . [but that] the law and lawyers have played a subtle, but often 
significant, role in ‘framing’ disease.”
113
  The way that diseases are 
framed or defined in the socio-cultural milieu and later accepted in 
the mainstream impacts the regulatory status of drugs used to treat 
 
 110 Adele E. Clarke et al., Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of Health, 
Illness, and U.S. Biomedicine, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 442, 442 (Peter Conrad ed., 2005); see also Shankar & Subish, supra note 
105, at 275 (“Medicalisation is the process of turning ordinary life events and its cus-
tomary ups and downs into medical conditions.”).   
 111 Clarke et al., supra note 110, at 443. 
 112 Peter Conrad, The Social and Cultural Meanings of Illness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 104, 104. 
 113 Noah, supra note 32, at 252 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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these diseases as well as how pharmaceutical companies create adver-
tising campaigns.
114
 
Sociologists have explained that “recognizing that drugs are 
concrete material objects does not prevent their simultaneous analy-
sis as complex social phenomena.”
115
  The “illness identity” concept 
helps explain how this social phenomenon emerges: “[A]n illness 
identity refers to an understanding of self, and affiliation with others, 
on the basis of shared experiences of symptoms and suffering.”
116
  
The illness identity subsequently becomes associated with particular 
pharmaceutical treatments.
117
  For example, consider how meno-
pause, which used to be described as “a natural life event for women, 
became defined as a ‘deficiency disease’ in the 1960s when medical 
therapy became readily available to treat it.”
118
 
The concept of disease, and its impact on promoted drug treat-
ments, is malleable especially as medicines become “increasingly 
available for conditions which have so far been regarded as the natu-
ral result of ageing or as a part of the normal range of human emo-
tions.”
119
  Thus, “although biological and clinical factors have set 
boundaries for which symptoms might plausibly be linked in a disease 
concept, social influences have largely determined which symptom 
clusters have become diseases.”
120
  The pharmaceutical industry and 
marketing firms have played an important role in perpetuating this 
process: “Sadness, or sexual problems, both arguably non-medical in 
nature, but variably transformed by the diagnostic labels ‘depression’ 
 
 114 See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Disease Mongering? The Selling of Fibromyalgia, PHARMALOT 
BLOG (Jan. 14, 2008, 7:50 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/01/disease-
mongering-the-selling-of-fibromyalgia/ (describing the case of fibromyalgia). 
 115 David Cohen et al., Medications and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 275, 278. 
 116 Kristin Barker, Self-Help Literature and the Making of an Illness Identity: The Case of 
Fibromyalgia Syndrome (FMS), in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 133, 135. 
 117 See, e.g., “Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope” PSA by the NFA, YOUTUBE (Sept. 12, 
2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMCECMsW1RE&feature=related [here-
inafter Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope] (the public service announcement by the 
National Fibromyalgia Association, co-sponsored by Pfizer, the maker of Lyrica, the 
first FDA-approved treatment for fibromyalgia). 
 118 Conrad, supra note 112, at 105; see also Kaufman, supra note 109 (“[F]ederal 
officials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have en-
couraged women to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an 
inevitable and natural set of changes to be managed.”). 
 119 Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 276. 
 120 Jutel, supra note 43, at 281 (quoting R. Aronowitz, When Do Symptoms Become a 
Disease?, 134 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 9, pt. 2, 803 (2001)). 
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and ‘erectile dysfunction’, both of which trigger an army of 
medicalised actions, therapies and processes.”
121
 
Fibromyalgia, or fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS)—“a chronic dis-
order characterized by widespread pain, tenderness, and stiffness of 
muscles . . . that is typically accompanied by fatigue, headache, and 
sleep disturbances”
122
—is a classic example of the social construction 
of disease.
123
  While medical accounts of patients suffering from symp-
toms associated with this illness have existed for hundreds of years, 
the actual disease “has existed as a specific diagnosis only since the 
mid-1970s.”
124
  FMS is a controversial pain disorder because “there is 
no commonly accepted medical or organic explanation.”
125
  FMS is a 
“contested illness” because many people suffer from it, but physicians 
“tend to be skeptical about its organic origin.”
126
  Some doctors who 
do not consider FMS a medically diagnosable disease suggest that 
“diagnosing the condition actually worsens suffering by causing pa-
tients to obsess over aches that other people simply tolerate.”
127
  In 
fact, Dr. Frederick Wolfe, the lead author of the seminal paper that 
first defined the diagnostic criteria for FMS, is “cynical and discour-
aged about the diagnosis . . . [and] now considers the condition a 
physical response to stress, depression, and economic and social anx-
iety.”
128
  He explained that “[s]ome of us in those days thought that 
we had actually identified a disease, which this clearly is not . . . .  To 
make people ill, to give them an illness, was the wrong thing.”
129
  The 
New York Times reported, however, that “[d]octors who specialize in 
treating [FMS] say that the disorder is undertreated and that its suf-
ferers have been stigmatized as chronic complainers.”
130
  Accordingly, 
 
 121 Id. at 285. 
 122 Fibromyalgia Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MED. DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/fibromyalgia (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 123 Barker, supra note 116, at 133. 
 124 Id. at 133–34. 
 125 Peter Conrad, The Experience of Illness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 130, 130. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Alex Berenson, Drug Approved. Is Disease Real? N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/health/14pain.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.   
 128 Id. 
 129 Id.  
 130 Id.  
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disease-branding reduces the stigma associated with this condition 
and helps legitimize it as a medical condition.
131
 
The most prominent reason for the FMS controversy is its “bio-
medical invisibility” because there are neither objective indicators nor 
diagnostic tests for the disease.
132
  Although “the American College of 
Rheumatology established criteria for the classification of FMS in 
1990,”
133
 there is still no specific and conclusive diagnostic test, so 
doctors make a diagnosis by evaluating subjective symptoms.
134
  Thus, 
the biomedical uncertainty about FMS stands in sharp contrast to 
the subjective experiences of individuals diagnosed with FMS. . . .  
The outcome of this paradox for many with FMS is that they find 
themselves in an epistemological purgatory in which they ques-
tion their own sanity precisely because of their certainty about the 
realness of their experience in the face of public doubt.
135
 
The “epistemological purgatory” is where pharmaceutical companies 
thrive—and where the FDA is properly absent.  The FDA’s role in 
disease-creation is outside the scope of its legislative mandate; the 
Agency only regulates the advertising of drugs, not the authenticity of 
diseases.  Pharmaceutical companies exploit this opportunity through 
their advertising power in order to construct knowledge about the ex-
istence and reality of the disease and promote their newly approved 
drug treatment.
136
 
 
 131 The president of the National Fibromyalgia Association proclaimed that “[t]he 
day that the F.D.A. approved a drug and we had a public service announcement, my 
pain became real to people.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132 Barker, supra note 116, at 134; see also About Fibromyalgia, NAT’L FIBROMYALGIA 
ASS’N, http://www.fmaware.org/PageServerded3.html?pagename=fibromyalgia (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2012) (“Unlike a disease, which is a medical condition with a specific 
cause or causes and recognizable signs and symptoms, a syndrome is a collection of 
signs, symptoms, and medical problems that tend to occur together but are not relat-
ed to a specific, identifiable cause.” (emphasis added)). 
 133 Barker, supra note 116, at 134. 
 134 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LIVING WITH FIBROMYALGIA, DRUGS APPROVED TO 
MANAGE PAIN 2 (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm107805.pdf.  
 135 Barker, supra note 116, at 134. 
 136 See infra Part IV.B.1.c (illustrating the promotional strategies used by various 
DTC drug ads).  Interestingly, promotional practices can sometimes precede FDA 
approval when pharmaceutical companies brand diseases and physicians create new 
diagnostic criteria listing symptoms of the disease that the drug will be able to treat.  
See Cohen et al., supra note 115, at 277 (“[P]romotion of a drug by its manufacturers 
may actually precede the clinical trials . . . . The promotion may involve funding pro-
fessional committees working on the creation of a new psychiatric diagnostic catego-
ry listing specific target symptoms, treatment of which the new drug is then expected 
to improve.”). 
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Furthermore, the history of flibanserin and FSD/HSDD provides 
a unique illustration of the interrelationship between medicalization 
and the pharmaceutical industry.  Flibanserin’s origin is as an unin-
tended side effect of a treatment for an unrelated disease.  Essential-
ly, it demonstrates the interplay between research, development, and 
marketing tactics as a drug developed for one purpose can be mar-
keted as a treatment for another disease: 
Studies of [flibanserin] showed it didn’t work well as an antide-
pressant but showed that it  didn’t appear to damp sexual desire as 
some antidepressants do.  The FDA said antidepressant studies 
showed flibanserin was superior to placebo  and a comparator 
drug with respect to a question about “how strong is your sex 
drive” on a sexual-experience scale. That finding led Boehringer 
Ingelheim to develop the product as a treatment for women with 
HSDD.
137
 
Another crucial observation concerns how the name of the disease 
changed from FSD to HSDD.  The history of the disease shows that “it 
was a convergence of pharmaceutical companies, urologists closely 
associated with th[e] industry, and media-savvy sex therapists . . . 
which resulted in the creation and promotion of a diagnosis of ‘fe-
male sexual dysfunction.’”
138
  One scholar noted how “[t]he unno-
ticed shift in 2004 in FSD identity and promotion from female sexual 
arousal disorder to hypoactive sexual desire disorder is another hall-
mark moment in the FSD story, illustrating how the effort to match 
up some drug with FSD moved freely among symptoms and labels.”
139
 
Industry-invented diseases exist and continue to proliferate due 
to the pervasive effect of medicalization.  Medicalizing normal condi-
tions into treatable diseases is the undercurrent upon which some 
prescription drugs drift into the marketplace.  Because medicaliza-
tion is a sociological mechanism, it is outside the FDA’s jurisdiction; it 
is an unregulated yet effective instrument within the drug companies’ 
marketing toolbox. 
C. How Drug Companies Advertise: Explaining the Disease-Branding/ 
Drug-Mongering Strategy 
Critics condemn the pharmaceutical industry for its promotional 
practices of medicalizing non-disease conditions in order to create 
 
 137 Dooren, FDA Questions, supra note 24. 
 138 Jutel, supra note 43, at 292. 
 139 Tiefer, supra note 26, at 4.   
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new markets for drug treatments.
140
  Disease-branding turns “ordinary 
ailments into medical problems, see[s] mild symptoms as serious, 
treat[s] personal problems as medical ones, see[s] risks as diseases, 
and frame[s] prevalence estimates to increate potential markets.”
141
  
Disease-branding convinces healthy people they are sick, while drug-
mongering convinces these newfound patients that they need 
drugs.
142
 
Havidol is a realistic parody of a disease-branding and drug-
mongering campaign; although fictitious and satirical, it is neverthe-
less representative of the promotional practice.  Australian artist Jus-
tine Cooper created a DTC advertising campaign to promote the fake 
drug Havidol to treat the farcical disease Dysphoric Social Attention 
Consumption Deficit Anxiety Disorder.
143
  According to its website 
and prescribing information, Havidol is “the only known medication 
available for this newly recognized disorder.”
144
  The public response 
to the exhibit has been surprising.
145
  The exhibit, which includes a 
mock website and television and print advertisements, is so believable 
that people think it is an authentic DTC advertising campaign.
146
  A 
review of the exhibit describes Havidol as 
a frightening approximation of the real thing.  Parody gives way 
to possibility as Cooper recreates the entire drug marketing pro-
cess—from the invention of a new disorder (wherein a need is 
first found and then the disorder is penned) to the branding pro-
 
 140 E.g., NIKOLAS ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF: BIOMEDICINE, POWER, AND 
SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (2007) (“Pharmaceutical companies 
have been singled out for particular criticism, accused of selling many new drugs at 
inflated prices and with false promises, ignoring potentially dangerous side effects, 
and medicalizing nondisease conditions such as baldness or lack of libido to create 
new markets in the ruthless pursuit of shareholder value.” (citations omitted)). 
 141 Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 275. 
 142 Id.  
 143 Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/16/us-drug-fake-idUSL165119520070216 
[hereinafter Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!].  
 144 Understanding Havidol, HAVIDOL, http://www.havidol.com/understanding.html 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 145 Consumers Fall for Havidol Pharmaceutical Parody that Promotes a Fictitious Anxiety 
Disorder, NAT. NEWS.COM (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.naturalnews.com/021660.html 
[hereinafter Consumers Fall for Havidol Parody].  
 146 Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143; see also Marylyn Do-
nahue, When Branding Is Art, PHARM. EXEC. (Oct. 15, 2007), 
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=465558
&sk=&date=&&pageID=1 (discussing the trade magazine Pharmaceutical Executive’s 
response to the Havidol campaign). 
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cess of naming the drug, its pill and logo design, promotional 
merchandise, and finally its website, TV and print advertise-
ments.
147
 
Cooper, commenting on her exhibit and the “comedic” nature of re-
al drug advertisements, states: “I couldn’t be outrageously spoofy so I 
really wanted it to be a more subtle kind of parody that draws you in, 
makes you want this thing and then makes you wonder why you want 
it and maybe where you can get it.”
148
  This strategy for a successful 
parody parallels the actual DTC advertising strategy used in pharma-
ceutical promotional practices.
149
  Critics of this strategy would reject 
the arguably comedic nature of these commercials because the fact 
that viewers were persuaded that they have a fake disease and need a 
fake drug treatment demonstrates just how easily pharmaceutical 
companies can succeed in marketing legitimate, albeit controversial, 
diseases and drugs.
150
 
Dr. Carl Elliot explains that disease-branding works very well in 
two situations: (1) “the shameful condition that can be 
destigmatized”
151
 and (2) “a condition that can be plausibly portrayed 
as under-diagnosed.”
152
  During the process of DTC advertising, dis-
 
 147 Justine Cooper, Havidol, DANEYAL MAHMOOD GALLERY, 
http://daneyalmahmood.com/ArtistsPages/Justine/PastExhibitions/JustineHavidol.
html (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 148 Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143. 
 149 For a description of various drug DTC advertising strategies, see infra Part 
IV.B.1.c. 
 150 For a discussion of the “outrageousness” of DTC advertising, see infra Part 
IV.B.1.b.  If Havidol were real and provided a safe and effective remedy, then the 
FDA should approve it because it is inappropriate paternalism for the FDA to prevent 
this drug from entering the market based on the controversy surrounding the exist-
ence of the disease.  Doctors and patients, in an informative, interactive process, 
should determine the utility of the drug for each patient’s individual needs.  For dis-
cussion of Academic Detailing as a way to strengthen this interactive process, see su-
pra Part IV.C. 
 151 Elliott, supra note 14.  
For instance, when Pharmacia launched Detrol in the late 1990s, the 
condition the drug treated was known to doctors as “urge inconti-
nence.”  Patients called it “accidentally peeing in my pants” and were 
embarrassed to bring it up with their physicians.  Pharmacia fixed the 
problem by rebranding the condition as “overactive bladder.” 
Id. 
 152 Id. 
Branding such a condition assures potential patients that they are part 
of a large and credible community of sufferers.  For example, in 1999, 
the FDA approved the antidepressant Paxil for the treatment of “social 
anxiety disorder,” a condition previously known as “shyness.”  In order 
to convince shy people they had social anxiety disorder, Glax-
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eases and drugs become “adjectival.”
153
  A psychological connection 
between disease and drug develops when symptoms (e.g., inability to 
achieve or maintain an erection or high cholesterol levels) are 
medicalized into disease-like states (e.g., erectile dysfunction or hy-
perlipidemia/hypercholesterolemia) because the disease becomes 
synonymous and psychologically associated with the advertised drug 
treatment (e.g., Viagra or Lipitor).
154
  An inextricable link develops 
between the disease and the drug in the minds of consumers when a 
branded disease is attached to a brand name drug; it is the essence of 
pharmaceutical promotional practices. 
Although “consumption of medical and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts is itself shaped by brand images and brand loyalty,”
155
 disease-
branding is a distinct concept from advertising the brand of the drug 
(i.e., drug-mongering) because disease-branding creates a brand for 
the disease itself.  Used together, however, they create a truly effective 
pharmaceutical promotional campaign as disease-awareness ads be-
come inextricably linked in consumers’ minds with the brand name 
drug that treats the disease.
156
 
Pharmaceutical marketing aimed at destigmatizing conditions so 
that people feel comfortable seeking help can promote the public 
health; thus, the FDA will allow this form of promotion as long as the 
drug continues to be safe and effective and the drug’s DTC advertis-
 
oSmithKline, the maker of Paxil, hired a PR firm . . . [to] put together 
a public awareness campaign called “Imagine being allergic to people.”  
Id. 
 153 SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 58 (1989). 
 154 See generally Tanuja Singh & Donnavieve Smith, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription 
Drug Advertising: A Study of Consumer Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 22 J. CONSUMER 
MKTG. 369 (2005) (analyzing consumers’ perceptions of DTC drug advertisements 
and requests for brand name drugs); Tim Scott et al., Killing Me Softly: Myth in Phar-
maceutical Advertising, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 1484 (2004) (examining how drug advertise-
ments use visual and linguistic imagery to create associations between diseases and 
products). 
 155 ROSE, supra note 140, at 30. 
 156 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: “HELP-SEEKING” 
AND OTHER DISEASE AWARENESS COMMUNICATIONS BY OR ON BEHALF OF DRUG AND 
DEVICE FIRMS 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm070068.pdf (“Psychology and marketing research suggests that the 
greater the perceptual similarity between disease awareness communications and 
reminder or product claim promotions . . . the more likely it is that the separate mes-
sages contained in the two pieces will be remembered together in memory as one 
entity.” (citation omitted)). 
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ing complies with federal statutes and regulations.
157
  Nevertheless, 
although this practice can be positive, it can simultaneously be ex-
tremely harmful as it “turns healthy people into patients, wastes pre-
cious resources, and causes iatrogenic harm.”
158
 
IV. A CASE STUDY OF LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES FOR 
PHARMACEUTICAL PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES 
A. The FDA’s Role in Defining Disease and Regulating  
Disease-Branding 
The FDA’s mandate, according to the FD&C Act and its accom-
panying legislative history, is to approve drugs that are safe and effec-
tive for their intended use.
159
  The role of the FDA vis-á-vis the phar-
maceutical industry is to act as a regulatory gate-keeper by 
determining which drugs enter the market.
160
  The FDA approves a 
drug for market if it is safe and effective for its intended use; there-
fore, it is an inappropriate expansion of its grant of authority for the 
FDA to consider the legitimacy of diseases.  The FDA is an active gate-
keeper and regulator of the pharmaceutical industry, but not a pa-
ternalistic agency or a national scientific arbiter of disease classifica-
tion.  The critique that the pharmaceutical industry is economically 
exploiting the public by turning Americans into medical consumers 
need not concern the FDA as this is beyond its legislative mandate.  
Thus, while disease-branding may be a valid critique of the drug in-
dustry, it should not implicate the FDA because the Agency regulates 
neither diseases nor doctors’ treatment of these diseases.  The FDA 
approves drugs as safe and effective in order to provide doctors with 
an arsenal of treatment options; doctors ultimately make the treat-
ment decision by determining whether a particular patient suffers 
from a disease and how to best treat that patient.
161
 
 
 157 Id. at 3.  Disease-awareness communication is not subject to risk-disclosure re-
quirements; however, “in other situations where a supposed disease awareness com-
munication is determined to, by implication, identify a particular drug . . . the com-
munication can be considered labeling or advertising and can therefore be subject to 
regulation by FDA.” Id.  
 158 Moynihan & Henry, supra note 29, at 425. 
 159 See supra Part II.B. 
 160 See Carpenter, supra note 67, at 404. 
 161 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or 
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer 
any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legiti-
mate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”). 
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The limited scope of the FDA’s role in defining disease depends 
on a multifaceted consideration of its legislative mandate—
promoting and protecting the public health—juxtaposed against the 
social, political, and medical milieu: what drugs pharmaceutical 
companies are developing and for what conditions, what advisory 
committees are recommending, and how patient advocacy groups are 
responding.  As mentioned above, the FDA does play some role in 
defining, or legitimizing, diseases because the perception of the dis-
ease may shape the regulatory approval process.
162
  A drug’s risk-
benefit calculus is dependent on the FDA’s perception of the disease, 
the drug’s intended use, and the treatment population.  For example, 
the FDA must consider whether a drug cures cancer, baldness, or 
shyness and whether these cures have risks, including morbidity and 
mortality, because these factors alter the drug’s respective risk-benefit 
profiles for approval purposes.  An effective cure for a deadly cancer 
with potentially lethal side effects has a high efficacy rating, and alt-
hough the risk of death gives the drug a low safety rating, the overall 
risk-benefit profile weighs in favor of approval for a specific patient 
population because of the drug’s positive effect on the cancer’s mor-
tality rate.  By contrast, an effective baldness or shyness cure that is 
associated with a high risk of death may have a high efficacy rating, 
but its overall public health benefit of curing these benign conditions 
cannot outweigh the high risk of death associated with the treatment.  
Thus the risk is probably so high that the overall risk-benefit profile 
weighs in favor of rejection.  In addition, FDA regulators (the indi-
viduals rather than the institutional entity) are social beings who can 
be influenced by the medicalization of disease-branding.  If they con-
sider the disease more severe than it actually is or are persuaded by 
disease-awareness ads and other forms of disease promotion that a 
normal condition ought to be treated, they may be more inclined to 
give less weight to adverse events associated with a drug intended to 
treat the industry-invented disease in their risk-benefit calculus.
163
 
 
 162 See supra Part II.B (discussing accelerated product review and orphan-drug sta-
tus). 
 163 For example, Pfizer’s NDA for Viagra convinced the FDA that erectile dysfunc-
tion is severe enough and the benefits of Viagra are sufficient to outweigh the risks of 
the drug.  See Approval Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation, 
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Sandra J. Croak-Brossman, Pfizer Pharms. 
Prod. Corp. Ltd. (Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/1998/20895ltr.pdf.  But see supra notes 22–23 and ac-
companying text (explaining that Boehringer Ingelheim could not convince the Ad-
visory Panel that HSDD was sufficiently severe and that the benefits of flibanserin 
were great enough, to outweigh the drug’s adverse side effects). 
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Regardless of the FDA’s limited purpose in defining diseases for 
the approval process, it has no role in regulating disease-branding 
strategies beyond ensuring that the advertisements are not false or 
misleading.
164
  Advertisements can shape the public’s perception of a 
disease and encourage treatment with a drug, while complying fully 
with the FD&C Act and its regulations.
165
  Because these promotional 
practices do not violate the regulatory scheme instituted to prevent 
the adulteration and misbranding of drugs, critics of these practices 
are left without a viable administrative tool to remedy the problems 
that stem from these practices. 
B. Legal Remedies: Possible Causes of Action for Disease-Branding and 
Drug-Mongering 
The determination whether an ailment is a disease is a complex 
socially constructed process.
166
  Although it may have implications for 
FDA approval, it should be reiterated that the FDA’s regulatory func-
tion in determining what constitutes a drug is purely statutory inter-
pretation and that the Agency’s decision to approve a drug for the 
market is based on its evaluation of the safety and efficacy of the 
drug’s intended use.
167
  Because the disease-branding and drug-
mongering advertising strategies appear, as a general matter, to be 
legal and in compliance with the FD&C Act, it seems that there are 
no statutory or regulatory bars to this form of pharmaceutical promo-
tion.  If labeling and DTC advertising are legal, an argument that 
drug companies are misbranding in violation of the Act will fail. 
Thus, if the FDA does not have jurisdiction in this area because 
the overall strategy complies with federal drug laws and disease-
branding by Big Pharma continues unabated by regulatory re-
strictions (provided that the advertisements remain compliant), then 
what is left of the critique of disease-branding and drug-mongering?  
Because the argument that this practice harms society and public 
health is still valid from the sociology-of-health perspective, this 
Comment considers whether there are any legal remedies available 
for people who suffer injuries as a result of these practices.  Relying 
 
 164 It seems difficult to prove that disease-branding could be considered mislead-
ing in violation of 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3) because there is justified medical science 
supporting the legitimacy of the disease, regardless of any surrounding controversy. 
 165 See supra Part II.C (describing how DTC broadcast advertising generally com-
plies with the federal regulatory scheme). 
 166 For a discussion of the social construction of disease, see supra Part III.B.  
 167 See supra Part II.B (discussing the role of the FDA as a regulatory agency that 
approves drugs for market if they are safe and effective for their intended use). 
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on the sociology-of-health and medicalization frameworks, critics can 
use expert testimony from sociology, consumer-psychology, and med-
ical scholarship to provide evidence that the promotional practices 
are tortious.  Consequently, it seems that the critics’ only option to 
hold pharmaceutical companies liable for the arguably egregious 
practices of disease-branding and drug-mongering would be to file a 
test case in which a plaintiff with standing sues a drug company in 
tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) or negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) or sues his or her doctors 
for medical malpractice, which, in a circuitous way, could affect drug 
companies’ advertising practices. 
It is crucial to note at the outset that the fact that these drugs 
have been approved by the FDA does not exempt drug companies 
from liability.
168
  Because FDA approval does not preempt state-law 
tort claims for drugs approved through the NDA process, compliance 
with the FD&C Act is not necessarily a safe-harbor or a complete de-
fense to tort claims.
169
  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in Wyeth 
v. Levine that brand name drug companies are amenable to suit un-
der state tort law.
170
  Thus, even if drug companies comply with the 
rules and regulations for DTC advertising, plaintiffs will not be 
preempted from suing them for disease-branding and drug-
mongering advertising campaigns if these claims fit into state negli-
gence regimes.  The following sections analyze potential claims for 
IIED, NIED, and medical malpractice. 
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) 
Havidol, the brilliant parody of prescription drug advertising,
171
 
can act as a hypothetical case study for the possibility of an IIED 
claim.
172
  One article commented how the “media exhibit featuring a 
campaign for a fake drug to treat a fictitious illness is causing a stir 
 
 168 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009). 
 169 Id. at 1191. 
 170 Id. at 1202 (“In keeping with Congress’ decision not to pre-empt common-law 
tort suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a complementary 
form of drug regulation.”).  Contra PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) 
(holding that federal drug regulations applicable to generic drugs preempt state tort 
claims). 
 171 See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. 
 172 Although Future Pharms, Inc., the manufacturer of Havidol, is not amenable 
to a lawsuit because fictitious defendants cannot be served with process, the evidence 
that consumers legitimately believe that the invented disease and drug are real re-
veals consumers’ propensity to be influenced by pharmaceutical advertising. 
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because some people think the illness is real.”
173
  Another article 
asked, “What happens if you create a fake disorder and offer a fake 
drug to treat it? You get thousands of people fooled that they might 
have an invented disease.”
174
  If an artist can convince ordinary people 
that they have a purely imaginary disease that could be treated with a 
fictional drug, then surely an otherwise healthy and reasonable per-
son could be convinced that he or she suffers from an industry-
invented disease that can be treated by the pharmaceutical compa-
ny’s real drug bearing an FDA-stamp-of-approval.  Thus, a crucial le-
gal question emerges as to whether this conduct is sufficiently outra-
geous to support a cause of action. 
The tort of IIED may provide a viable cause of action that could 
be used to challenge these pharmaceutical promotional practices, 
and which would not be preempted under Wyeth.175  IIED is a relative-
ly recent tort,
176
 and, although every state recognizes it as an inde-
pendent cause of action,
177
 the area of law is unsettled.
178
  Even if 
courts have yet to recognize an IIED claim premised on disease-
branding and drug-mongering,
179
 this does not mean that such a 
claim would be precluded, and thus should not deter critics from ex-
ploring the possibility of filing a complaint. 
There is at least one reported case analyzing an IIED claim that 
is premised on a patient watching television, which can be used as a 
foundation to develop the test case.
180
  In Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., a pa-
tient received a heart-valve replacement, and after watching a televi-
sion program discussing incidents of the valve malfunctioning, expe-
 
 173 Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143. 
 174 Consumers Fall for Havidol Parody, supra note 145 (emphasis added). 
 175 If the test-case plaintiff has not suffered physical injury, IIED would be the only 
legal recourse because the other negligence-based torts require physical impact or 
injury.  See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing NIED). 
 176 Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a 
Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 472 (2000) (citing State 
Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 337 (Cal. 1952)) (showing that 
California was the first state to recognize IIED as a cause of action); see also 4 NEIL M. 
LEVY ET AL., CALIFORNIA TORTS § 44.01 (2011) (describing how the first California 
court to recognize IIED as an independent cause of action viewed the tort as protect-
ing the right to be free from invasions of “emotional and mental tranquility”). 
 177 Markin, supra note 176, at 472 n.17 (collecting cases). 
 178 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965) (“The law is still in a stage 
of development, and the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.”). 
 179 As of March 2012, no reported cases on LexisNexis contain the phrase “disease 
branding” or “drug mongering.”   
 180 Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33 (M.D. Pa. 1989). 
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rienced severe emotional distress.
181
  Although the court held that 
plaintiff’s emotional distress was related to the show’s content and 
not to the defective device,
182
 this situation is clearly distinguishable 
from the test case.  The fear associated with watching a television 
news show that is not affiliated with a drug company and is intended 
to inform the viewer is different from the fear resulting from watch-
ing a drug-company-created and sponsored advertising campaign 
(which, arguably, is intended to induce a sense of fear or “health anx-
iety”
183
 in consumers to persuade viewers to purchase their drugs). 
a. Elements of an IIED Cause of Action 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the prima facie case 
for “outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress” (better 
known as IIED) is satisfied when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant, 
“by extreme and outrageous conduct[,] intentionally or recklessly causes se-
vere emotional distress to another.”
184
  Recovery is possible for “mental 
distress or disturbance . . . even in the absence of physical injury or 
any other actionable injury.”
185
 
First, “[t]he element of moral outrage may well be the critical 
element.”
186
  The plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct 
was extreme, which is satisfied “only if the defendant’s conduct is so 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond 
all possible grounds of decency, that it must be regarded as atrocious 
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
187
  According to the 
Restatement, “the recitation of the facts to an average member of the 
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead 
him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”
188
  Here, the role of “applied psychol-
ogy” is imperative because marketing-psychology experts can inter-
pret advertising campaigns and give expert testimony about the caus-
al link between disease-branding and drug-mongering tactics and the 
 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 35. 
 183 See infra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing hypochondria and health anxiety). 
 184 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) (emphasis added). 
 185 13 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS, 
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 55A.02 (2011). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id.; see also John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional 
Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 799 (2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
46 cmt. d (1965)).  
 188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). 
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resulting emotional distress.
189
  The distress could be characterized as 
the psychological manipulation of an otherwise healthy person into 
believing that he or she has a disease that is treatable with drugs, 
coupled with the iatrogenic harm resulting from this pharmaceutical 
treatment that the patient would not have experienced had the pa-
tient not been convinced that he or she needed the drug.  Moreover, 
although consumers would not be shocked to learn that the drug 
companies advertise to make a profit, they could be shocked to learn 
that the drug companies are inventing diseases and convincing 
healthy people that they are sick; this could very well cross the 
threshold from persuasive advertising tactics to outrageous marketing 
behavior.  Accordingly, the quest for profit fails to address or identify 
the issue; attention in evaluating the extreme or outrageous conduct, 
which is the necessary element of the cause of action, should be fo-
cused on the means, not the ends. 
Second, in order for conduct to be considered intentional or 
reckless, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “intended his 
specific conduct and knew or should have known that emotional dis-
tress would likely result.”
190
  It is important to note that 
[a]ctual intent to cause emotional distress is not necessary, be-
cause the willful wrongdoer is charged with the duty of foreseeing 
the mental and emotional consequences that would naturally flow 
from his or her conduct. If the actor did not undertake the offen-
sive conduct for the purpose of causing the harm received, proof 
of the intent of the actor to cause that harm may nevertheless be 
implied by evidence of circumstances showing that the conduct 
was of a nature that reasonably should have been recognized as 
likely to cause the harm sustained.
191
 
Finally, the emotional distress “must be reasonably foreseeable 
and justified under the circumstances, attributing to the plaintiff the 
sensibility of a reasonable person,”
192
 unless the defendant knew or 
 
 189 For example, in United States v. 38 Dozen Bottles, More or Less, Labeled in Part 
Tryptacin, 114 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1953), the federal district court judge qualified 
two experts in the field of advertising and marketing psychology to testify whether 
drugs were misbranded in violation of the FD&C Act.  The judge explained that the 
witnesses “presented exhaustive analyses of the content of the advertisement and the 
effect which it was intended to have upon the prospective purchaser of the drug.”  Id. 
at 462; accord Applied Psychology in Action: Legal Status of Advertising and Marketing Psy-
chology Experts, 38 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 276, 276 (1954) (discussing the same case). 
 190 Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974).  This was the first time 
when the Virginia Supreme Court recognized the cause of action for IIED. 
 191 13 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, § 55A.02 (emphasis added). 
 192 Id. 
CETEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  2:29 PM 
2012] COMMENT 677 
 
took advantage of plaintiff’s “peculiar susceptibility to emotional dis-
tress.”
193
 
Because several cases rely on this standard to evaluate IIED 
claims, analyzing them is important to understand how they would 
apply in the test case.  In a federal case in Pennsylvania, Michtavi v. 
United States, the plaintiff was a prisoner who alleged that his fellow 
inmates attempted to scam him and, as a result, he suffered from de-
pression, which required treatment with the prescription medication 
Prozac.
194
  Plaintiff’s IIED claim, based on the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts’ definition,
195
 failed because the court concluded that the plain-
tiff did not allege any conduct that was sufficiently extreme or outra-
geous.
196
  Michtavi is a clear example of the high burden that plaintiffs 
must meet in order to successfully bring an action for IIED. 
In Estate of Duckett v. Cable News Network, LLLP, a federal court 
applying Florida law recognized that conduct involving the use of tel-
evision broadcasts could rise to the level of extreme and outrageous 
conduct.
197
  The court noted, however, that a successful claim for 
IIED under Florida law is extremely rare, as only ten reported cases 
were found in which a judgment was entered for a successful plaintiff 
and affirmed on appeal.
198
  In other words, “a cause of action for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress is one thing, avoiding sum-
mary judgment or prevailing at trial is quite another.”
199
  In this case, 
defendants CNN and Nancy Grace, the star and moderator of the 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 No. 4:07-CV-0628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *6–8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 
2009), aff’d, 345 F. App’x. 727 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 195 Id. at *20 n.7 (“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly recognized 
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but has consistently 
held that, if this cause of action were recognized, the Restatement would set forth the 
minimum elements necessary to state such a claim.”). 
 196 Id. at *22.  But see Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 
1979) (applying Pennsylvania law and holding that the knowing release of false in-
formation that a player was suffering from a fatal disease by a professional football 
team’s doctor could constitute outrageous conduct for the purposes of IIED); John-
son v. Caparelli, 625 A.2d 668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that a priest’s sexual 
molestation of an altar boy constituted the same, although the claim was ultimately 
rejected on other grounds); Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989) (holding that an energy company deliberately venting radioactive steam on an 
employee and concealing the extent of exposure constituted the same). 
 197 No. 5:06-cv-44, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667, at *21–23 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 
2008); see also Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33, 33 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (discuss-
ing an IIED claim premised on media broadcasts). 
 198 Estate of Duckett, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667, at *14. 
 199 Id. 
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Nancy Grace show, recorded a telephone interview with Duckett after 
her child went missing.
200
  The interview was scheduled to be televised 
the following day, but hours before the show was to air, Duckett 
committed suicide.  After the defendant aired the interview, 
Duckett’s parents began suffering from severe and debilitating emo-
tional distress.
201
  The plaintiffs successfully alleged at the pleading 
stage that the decision to air the show following their daughter’s sui-
cide was sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to state a cause 
of action for IIED.
202
 
In Lamothe v. Russell, a Connecticut state court denied defend-
ant’s motion to strike the complaint for IIED in an employment con-
text when the allegation included disparaging remarks about health 
problems.
203
  The court held that, under Connecticut law, sufficiently 
extreme and outrageous conduct had occurred when an employer 
constantly belittled the plaintiff by telling her that she had health 
problems because she was overweight.
204
  Analogously, pharmaceuti-
cal companies’ advertising campaigns attempt, in a way, to belittle 
healthy consumers by persuading them that they are sick.  Although 
the Lamothe court distinguished ordinary comments from those made 
by people in positions of control, this should not be an obstacle for 
the test case plaintiffs because pharmaceutical companies are in a po-
sition of power as experts in the field of drug promotion and market-
ing. 
In Elson v. Consolidated Edison, Co., an employer subjected the 
employee-plaintiff to eight hours of interrogation, knowing of the 
employee’s underlying psychological condition for which he was re-
ceiving treatment.
205
  As a result, he suffered mental anguish, and the 
court concluded that these facts stated a cause of action for IIED be-
cause the conduct complained of could be found to be extreme and 
outrageous.
206
  Although pharmaceutical and advertising companies 
are, or should be, aware of the existence of hypochondria in the gen-
eral population, it would be impossible to plead with particularity 
that a company knew that the specific plaintiff suffered from hypo-
 
 200 Id. at *2–3. 
 201 Id. at *21. 
 202 Id. at *22–23. 
 203 No. CV074022729S, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775, at *15 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 25, 2009). 
 204 Id. at *4. 
 205 641 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
 206  Id. at 294–95. 
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chondria
207
 and was thus extraordinarily susceptible to suffering ex-
treme emotional distress from disease-branding and drug-mongering.  
Therefore, unlike the Elson defendant, pharmaceutical companies 
may be able to escape liability because the plaintiff would probably be 
unable to prove that the company was aware of the plaintiff’s particu-
lar sensitivities and predilection to mental distress.
208
 
Because it is clear that the companies intend to produce a dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering campaign,
209
 the plaintiff can 
plead the “specific conduct” necessary for the intentional or reckless-
ness element.
210
  Although the companies know that some consumers 
would be convinced to seek the advertised drug, the plaintiff would 
have to show that the recognition that one might have a newfound 
disease is tantamount to experiencing emotional distress.  Even 
though emotional distress can be a consequence of the self-diagnosis 
that accompanies disease-branding, the plaintiff would need to allege 
that this was the logical consequence of seeing the campaign.  In oth-
er words, the plaintiff must allege that a drug company intended or 
should have known that emotional distress would likely follow from 
viewing the advertisement, rather than merely showing that learning 
of a new disease would result in the consumer experiencing emotion-
al distress. 
In California, outrageous conduct that is sustained or persistent 
and which affects the plaintiff over an extended period of time is 
more likely to be considered outrageous than conduct which is short-
lived.
211
  In addition, other cases recognize that individual acts may be 
insufficient, but the cumulative effect of these acts, when viewed as a 
pattern or course of conduct, could rise to the level of outrageous 
conduct.
212
  Thus, if one looks at disease-branding and drug-
mongering as a cumulative advertising campaign, rather than count-
 
 207 See infra note 226 and accompany text (discussing hypochondria). 
 208 In a class action, however, it might be possible to argue that pharmaceutical 
companies and their advertising companies had constructive knowledge of general 
rates of hypochondria such that the court could infer that the defendant took ad-
vantage of the plaintiffs’ peculiar susceptibility. 
 209 See, e.g., Landman, supra note 7; Vince Parry, Disease Branding: What Is It, Why it 
Works, and How to Do It—A Win-Win Marketing Strategy that Illuminates, Educates, and 
Promotes at the Same Time, PHARM. EXEC. (Oct. 1, 2007), 
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/Supplements/BrandingDisease/Ar
ticleStandard/Article/detail/465561.  
 210 Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974). 
 211 LEVY ET AL., supra note 176, § 44.01 & n.55. 
 212 Id. § 44.01 & n.56. 
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ing each time a consumer views a commercial as a discrete event, it is 
likely to satisfy California’s duration and cumulative-effect standard 
for determining whether alleged conduct is outrageous. 
In another Pennsylvania case, Rideout v. Hershey Medical Center, 
the plaintiffs’ child was diagnosed with a brain tumor, which they 
wanted to treat aggressively.
213
  Due to the child’s deteriorating condi-
tion and likely imminent demise, however, the hospital’s Ethics 
Committee decided that further treatment would be futile and dis-
connected the child’s ventilator without the parents’ presence.
214
  The 
parents suffered severe emotional anguish as a result of hearing over 
the loudspeaker that the ventilator had been disconnected and sub-
sequently witnessing their daughter’s death.
215
  The hospital argued 
that the IIED claim failed because the plaintiffs were not present 
when the ventilator was disconnected; however, the court concluded 
that “aural and contemporaneous perception of the removal of the 
ventilator is sufficient to allege presence.”
216
  Furthermore, the hospi-
tal asserted that its decision to disconnect the ventilator “was a thor-
oughly reasoned exercise of professional judgment and that accord-
ingly, as a matter of law, it did not act outrageously.”
217
  The court 
held that although the hospital’s decision to remove life support may 
have been reasonable, the conduct could still be considered extreme 
and outrageous to support a claim for IIED.
218
 
Analogously, in the test case, a plaintiff who views the advertise-
ment on television is “present” in the location where the intentional 
conduct occurs precisely because he or she perceives aurally and vis-
ually the substance of the commercial.  In addition, just like in Estate 
of Duckett, the plaintiff can witness the advertisements through broad-
cast media because there does not seem to be a limiting principle 
stating that the conduct must be witnessed live.  Moreover, presence 
is crucial for advertising success; the defendant pharmaceutical com-
pany is not only aware of but intends the plaintiff’s presence in front 
of the television so that the plaintiff views the commercial.  In addi-
tion, despite the ostensible reasonableness of the drug advertising 
campaign for the legitimate corporate goals of promoting sales and 
increasing profits, a court using the Rideout standard could still con-
 
 213 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 59–60 (C.P. Dauphin 1995). 
 214 Id. at 61–63. 
 215 Id. at 63. 
 216 Id. at 69. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
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clude that disease-branding and drug-mongering conduct is extreme 
and outrageous. 
b. Disease-Branding and Drug-Mongering as “Outrageous 
Conduct” 
In order to establish the first element, the plaintiff must allege 
that disease-branding and drug-mongering constitute outrageous 
conduct.  The question is whether the medicalization of arguably or-
dinary behavior into symptoms characterizing a disease (i.e., disease-
branding) and the psychological manipulation of healthy people to 
think that they are sick and require pharmaceutical treatment (i.e., 
drug-mongering) are evidence of outrageous conduct.  This section 
argues that drug-mongering, through DTC advertising campaigns, is 
probative of the outrageous conduct required to satisfy a prima facie 
case for IIED, despite the fact the advertisements otherwise comply 
with the FD&C Act and accompanying regulations. 
Although there is some research on the relationship between 
DTC advertising and consumer perceptions of drugs,
219
 consumer 
demand,
220
 and physician prescribing patterns,
221
 there is no research 
on the psychological effects of emotional distress associated with dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering.  Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that the theory is wrong or that the alleged conduct is not out-
rageous; it just requires plaintiffs to overcome the pleading burden by 
alleging sufficient facts that state a claim for relief that is plausible on 
its face.
222
 
In addition, at least one scholar has evaluated successful IIED 
claims in the media context.
223
  According to Professor Markin’s arti-
cle, the majority of successful claims resulted from outrageous “news-
 
 219 See Deborah F. Spake & Mathew Joseph, Consumer Opinion and Effectiveness of 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 24 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 283, 283 (2007) (“Limited re-
search has been done on the relationship between consumer perceptions of DTC 
advertising and its impact on consumer requests for pharmaceutical products.”). 
 220 See, e.g., Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs: 
Creating Consumer Demand, 281 JAMA 382 (1999) (discussing the effect of DTC adver-
tising on consumer demand for prescription drugs). 
 221 See, e.g., W.M. Zachry et al., Relationship Between Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and 
Physician Diagnosing and Prescribing, 59 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 42 (2002) (dis-
cussing the relationship between DTC advertising and physician diagnoses and pre-
scriptions associated with the advertised products).  
 222 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining the “plausibility” 
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)). 
 223 See Markin, supra note 176. 
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gathering behavior.”
224
  Relevant to the test case, however, are “con-
tent” claims where the content of the media message is the outra-
geous conduct.
225
  Although Professor Markin’s article does not dis-
cuss any case of pharmaceutical advertising, this does not preclude a 
court from concluding that a disease-branding and drug-mongering 
allegation entails sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct for an 
IIED claim. 
Consider a plaintiff with hypochondria who is subjected to a dis-
ease-branding and drug-mongering advertising campaign.
226
  Hypo-
chondriacs believe that ordinary physical symptoms are signs of more 
serious diseases.
227
  It is a psychosomatic disorder, which means that 
the etiology of the disorder is psychological, but it manifests in physi-
cal symptoms.
228
  This “health anxiety,” which affects up to twenty 
percent of the population, is a mental illness in which worrying about 
 
 224 Id. at 479 (discussing Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. 
Ohio 1997) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant-
journalist’s invasion of the plaintiff’s home and the broadcasting of images of her 
mother’s dead body was extreme and outrageous conduct)); see also id. at 481 (dis-
cussing KOVR-TV v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“[A] jury could find that a television reporter who attempts deliberately to manipu-
late the emotions of young children [by recording an interview with the children 
about their neighbors’ murder-suicide] . . . has engaged in conduct ‘so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . 
. . .’”)). 
 225 Id. at 484 (discussing Murray v. Scholosser, 574 A.2d 1339, 1340 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1990) (denying defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s complaint of IIED when 
radio host “stated, in reference to the photograph of the named plaintiff, that she 
was ‘too ugly to even rate,’ in light of her physical attractiveness and sexual desirabil-
ity, and that she had won the ‘dog of the week’ prize consisting of a case of Ken-L-
Ration and a dog collar”); see also id. at 485 (discussing Armstrong v. H&C 
Commc’ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 280, 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an even-
ing news broadcast airing gruesome close-up footage of a murdered child’s skull con-
stitutes outrageous conduct)). 
 226 Although a hypochondriac may not represent a “reasonable” person, if the de-
fendant-drug company knew of plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to hypochondria, 
the company could still be liable.  See supra text accompanying note 193.  Although it 
might be a dispositive defense to prove that the defendant lacked knowledge of a 
particular plaintiff’s hypochondria, the availability of the defense does not alter the 
viability of the prima facie case at the pleading stage.  Thus, although the case may 
be resolved in defendant’s favor at the summary judgment stage, the complaint 
could initially survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  See supra text 
accompanying note 199. 
 227 Hypochondria, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/ 
article/001236.htm (last updated Jan. 26, 2012); see also DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 
3, at 504–07. 
 228 Hypochondria—Definition, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/ 
health/hypochondria/DS00841(last updated Nov. 23, 2010). 
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potentially getting sick, or confusing minor symptoms for an undiag-
nosed condition, can result in actual physical sickness.
229
  The primary 
symptom of hypochondria is “intense fear or anxiety about having a 
serious disease or health condition,”
230
 and this fear can result from 
“[t]hinking [that one] ha[s] a disease after reading or hearing about 
it.”
231
  Although such people may realize that they are exaggerating 
their symptoms, it is difficult for them to cope, so they seek doctors 
and treatment.  Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies take ad-
vantage of consumers’ propensity for hypochondria by vigorously en-
gaging in disease-branding and drug-mongering and by preying on 
their health anxieties. 
The symptoms of hypochondria are exacerbated by the media,
232
 
so an analogy can be drawn to pharmaceutical company’s “disease-
awareness” ads, which implant the idea that potentially minor symp-
toms represent a major health concern.  Disease-awareness or help-
seeking ads are a form of disease-branding that “involves using public 
awareness campaigns in the media to encourage people to seek new 
treatments.”
233
  Accordingly, there is a thin line between promoting 
knowledge of diseases and the drug-mongering that is associated with 
branding diseases.
234
  As such, disease-branding “is the most insidious 
of the various forms that medical advertising . . . can take.”
235
 
Moreover, the symptoms that ordinarily accompany experienc-
ing stress (e.g., fast heart beat, headache, and gastrointestinal prob-
lems)
236
 are readily confused with symptoms of very serious diseases 
 
 229 See, e.g., Today Show: Tips to Overcome Your Medical Fears, BING VIDEOS (Oct. 10, 
2010), http://www.bing.com/videos/watch/video/tips-to-overcome-your-medical-
fears/6lrdd5r [hereinafter Today Show]. 
 230 Hypochondria—Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.mayoclinic. 
com/health/hypochondria/DS00841/DSECTION=symptoms [hereinafter Hypo-
chondria—Symptoms]. 
 231 Id.  
 232 See id. (“It’s become easier to search out health information on the Internet in 
recent years. Having easy access to information about every possible thing that could 
be wrong can fuel your anxiety.”); see also Today Show, supra note 229 (“[Hypochon-
dria is] certainly prevalent and of course it gets worse depending on the news. . . ,  
[for example,] the skin cancer warnings in the summer and the breast cancer warn-
ings all the time.”) 
 233 Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 275–76. 
 234 Id. at 277. 
 235 Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612. 
 236 Stress and Anxiety, TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/ 
health/guides/symptoms/stress-and-anxiety/overview.html#Considerations (last up-
dated June 16, 2011). 
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such as heart disease, brain tumor, and stomach cancer.
237
  Accord-
ingly, the advertising campaigns that rely on fear mongering to brand 
diseases—commercials that are extremely stress-inducing—can wors-
en a consumer’s ordinary stress levels into a full-blown episode of hy-
pochondria.  The purpose of inducing episodes of hypochondria is to 
motivate the consumer-patient to self-diagnose and seek the prescrip-
tion drug to treat the advertised disease.  Thus, a crucial component 
of disease-branding seems to be the utilization of stress to exacerbate 
hypochondria.  Because DTC advertising exacerbates hypochondria, 
plaintiffs could plausibly allege that drug companies capitalize on 
their particular susceptibility through these promotional strategies. 
The outrageous act does not only encompass the exploitation of 
hypochondriacs; in some cases, the advertisements can be so extreme 
that an objectively reasonable person (that is, somebody without hy-
pochondria) could be convinced that he or she suffers from the ad-
vertised disease.  For example, a reasonable man who experiences ra-
re or occasional sexual problems could be persuaded that he suffers 
from the disease of erectile dysfunction (ED) and requires pharma-
cotherapy.  Indeed, Pfizer’s DTC advertising campaign for the ED 
drug Viagra was an attempt to “ensure that the drug was seen as legit-
imate therapy for almost any man.”238  Because Viagra was never mar-
keted as a niche drug but rather as a treatment for any man with sub-
jective perceptions of sexual insecurities, “[t]he perceived prevalence 
of ED needed to be expanded”
239
 in order to broaden the market.
240
  
In this regard, the Viagra website explains that “ED is more common 
than you think.  More than half of men over 40 have some degree of 
ED.”
241
 
This ambiguous statistic focuses on different degrees of ED—
some of which could be considered within the normal range—and 
expands the definition by medicalizing slight deviations of normal 
 
 237 See Today Show, supra note 229 (“It’s not that [those with health anxiety] don’t 
have physical symptoms, it’s that they misinterpret things.  Like if their heart skips a 
beat it must be heart disease or a routine headache equals brain tumor.”). 
 238 Joel Lexchin, Bigger and Better: How Pfizer Redefined Erectile Dysfunction, 3 PLOS 
MED. 429, 429 (2006), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/ 
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030132 (emphasis added). 
 239 Id.  
 240 See, e.g., Elizabeth Lambdin, Note, A New Disease Born Every Minute: The Market-
ing of Pathology and the Exploitation of Gender-Based Insecurities and Sexuality to Sell Drugs, 
13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 145, 153 (2006). 
 241 Common Questions—How Can I Tell if It’s Erectile Dysfunction (ED)?, VIAGRA (Aug. 
20, 2010), http://www.viagra.com/questions.aspx#/SD_FCP.1.1/2/ (emphasis add-
ed). 
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functioning into a “disease.”
242
  Pfizer’s disease-branding and drug-
mongering campaign medicalized “rare or transitory failures to 
achieve or maintain erections”
243
 into degrees of ED that could be 
treated with a prescription for Viagra.  Thus, a reasonable man with a 
relatively normal sex life could be convinced, through this DTC 
broadcasting campaign, that he has a medical condition requiring 
pharmaceutical treatment simply because, for example, his penis was 
“hard enough for penetration but not completely hard.”
244
  The per-
vasiveness of Viagra’s promotional campaign coupled with the subjec-
tivity of ED symptoms and diagnosis
245
 increase the efficacy of—and 
intensify the problems associated with—disease-branding and drug-
mongering, even for reasonable, non-hypochondriacs. 
c. DTC Advertisements: Examples and Analysis 
DTC broadcast advertisements follow a distinct, almost boiler-
plate form, in which a list of vague and common symptoms are de-
scribed and linked to a disease (the disease-branding part of the ad-
vertisement), followed by a discussion of a prescription drug that will 
treat this disease and a recommendation to talk to one’s doctor to ob-
tain this drug (the drug-mongering part of the ad).  There is a pleth-
ora of DTC commercials that utilize this form. 
Consider, for example, the Requip commercial for Restless Leg 
Syndome (RLS), which exemplifies this formulaic advertising strate-
gy.
246
  It opens with a downward angle shot of a woman; with eerie 
music sounding in the background, she looks up into the camera and 
says: “[I]t was so frustrating, like a mystery I couldn’t solve.”
247
  After 
listing symptoms of “strange sensations” and linking these symptoms 
 
 242 Even the Viagra website recognizes that transient episodes of abnormal func-
tioning constitute ED.  Erectile Dysfunction Symptoms, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/erectile-dysfunction-
symptoms.aspx (“[E]rectile dysfunction symptoms can happen just once in a 
while.”). 
 243 Lexchin, supra note 238, at 430. 
 244 The Erection Hardness Score, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/erectile-dysfunction-
symptoms/erection-hardness-score.aspx (“If you’re concerned about your hardness 
score, ask your doctor if VIAGRA can help.”). 
 245 The “ED Test” is Usually Just a Talk, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/ed-test.aspx (stating that the “ED 
Test” is usually just a conversation with your physician about your symptoms). 
 246 Requip, YOUTUBE (Jan. 5, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=PL3G1MngqK4. 
 247 Id.  
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to the disease name, the commercial transitions aurally—the eerie 
music changes into an ethereal, delicate, and comforting sound as a 
doctor discusses a treatment option in the form of a prescription 
pharmaceutical. 
The Zelnorm commercial
248
  for Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) 
is also illustrative of the fear-inducement that stems from drug adver-
tising.  The voiceover begins by asking, “[A]re you one of the millions 
who feel twisted and bloated?”
249
 Immediately, the commercial de-
stigmatizes and legitimizes the soon-to-be-mentioned disease and 
then begins to latch onto consumer health anxiety by exposing the 
mystery of the disease: “[I]s your body telling you something is 
wrong, but you’re not sure why?”
250
  The commercial then lists symp-
toms, “abdominal pain or discomfort, bloating and constipation,” and 
suggests that you “see your doctor” because “[y]ou may have a medi-
cal condition called IBS with constipation.”
251
  Many people occasion-
ally suffer from IBS symptoms.
252
  Thus, not only does this commercial 
brand the disease through a litany of common symptoms, but most 
importantly, it references a prescription drug that treats the disease 
in order to legitimize both the disease and the drug treatment by the 
full weight of an FDA approval. 
Similarly, the Toviaz commercial for overactive bladder (OAB) 
begins with a voiceover: “Erin wants to get up and go without always 
worrying about where to go.”
253
  The emphasis on “worrying” appears 
to link the disease symptoms to the stress and anxiety associated with 
hypochondria.  One could argue that this is an attempt to exploit po-
tential consumers’ psychological predisposition to hypochondria in 
order to convince them that they have a disease and then inform 
them of the drug that will treat it.  Pharmaceutical companies can al-
 
 248 Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), supra note 88.  Although Zelnorm was withdrawn from 
the market and Amitiza is currently the only FDA-approved drug to treat IBS, An-
drew Pollack, Drug for Irritable Bowel Achieves Goals in Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, 
at B6, the Zelnorm commercial still represents a typical example of the disease-
branding of IBS.  Cf. Amitiza Multiple Plus Onstar, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsPPwxXVs8w. 
 249 Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), supra note 88. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 P.D. Higgins & J.F. Johanson, Epidemiology of Constipation in North America: A Sys-
tematic Review, 99 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 750 (2004) (“Constipation is very com-
mon, as approximately 63 million people in North America meet the Rome II crite-
ria for constipation.”); see also infra note 306 and accompanying text (explaining how 
FMS and IBS may be related). 
 253 CR AdWatch: Toviaz, supra note 90. 
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so take advantage of ordinary people’s health anxiety because rea-
sonable consumers (who are not hypochondriacs) who watch these 
commercials and identify with the actors’ experience of vague, com-
mon, and ordinary symptoms may logically conclude that they also 
have the advertised disease.  The commercial continues, “[I]f you 
have overactive bladder symptoms, today is the day to talk to your doc-
tor and ask about prescription Toviaz.”
254
  By strengthening the dis-
ease-drug connection, this marketing campaign generated a new 
market niche of patient-consumers.
255
  Upon visiting the website, one 
learns that the primary symptom of OAB, “urgency,” is a medical 
condition, rather than a normal bodily function.  To reinforce this 
notion, the website purposely emphasizes that “[o]veractive bladder 
(OAB) is a real medical condition [that is] more common than you may 
think,”
256
 in order to convince the skeptical consumer that the urgent 
need to urinate is a treatable medical condition. 
In addition, the website explains that 
[o]ver 33 million men and women in the United States have 
OAB. That’s 1 in 6 adults. So if you think you may have OAB, 
you’re not alone.  OAB is not necessarily a normal part of aging.  
Prevalence increases as you get older.  But the truth is that OAB 
can affect anyone at any age.
257
 
Herein lies the psychological manipulation underlying disease-
branding and drug-mongering: the commercial provides a vague ex-
planation of the symptoms (because everybody sometimes has strong 
urges to urinate), and immediately links it to a disease (thus legitimiz-
ing and medicalizing the symptoms).  Then its accompanying website 
reinforces the vague symptoms and suggests that the disease is under-
diagnosed and can affect anyone at any age.  Thus, if you merely 
think you have OAB, then it is entirely likely that you do because one 
in six adults have it, and if you think you experience these symptoms, 
 
 254 Id. 
 255 See Anne Landman, Branding Diseases to Sell Cures, PR WATCH BLOG (Oct. 12, 
2010, 12:44 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/node/9529 (“By making people think 
they have a new condition called ‘overactive bladder,’ the company created a market 
of 21 million potential patients.”); John Mack, Overactive Bladder: “Pharmacia Instru-
mental in Creating New Disease” Says Former VP, PHARMA MKTG. BLOG (Apr. 5, 2009, 8:49 
AM), http://pharmamkting.blogspot.com/2009/04/overactive-bladder-
pharmacia.html. 
 256 What Is Overactive Bladder (OAB)?, TOVIAZ, http://www.toviaz.com/overactive-
bladder.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2011). 
 257 How Common Is OAB?, TOVIAZ, http://www.toviaz.com/how-common-is-
overactive-bladder.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2011).  
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you should immediately consult your physician for pharmaceutical 
treatment. 
The Latisse commercials provide another example of disease-
branding and drug-mongering.  The advertisement begins like a typi-
cal cosmetic commercial for a new mascara product; however, the ad 
quickly medicalizes “inadequate or not enough lashes” into 
“hypotrichosis” using a combination of loud, upbeat music and stun-
ning close-ups of eyeshadowed eyes with full lashes.
258
  Then, Brooke 
Shields enters the screen asking how it is possible to grow lashes; she 
proclaims, “I’m using Latisse, the first and only FDA-approved pre-
scription treatment.”
259
  The advertisement ends with Shields saying, 
“Ask your doctor if Latisse is right for you,”
260
 but then suggests to “find 
a doctor at Latisse.com today.”
261
  One might question why one’s reg-
ular primary-care physician would not diagnose eyelash hypotrichosis 
or prescribe Latisse.  It seems clear that this statement is an example 
of drug-mongering: instead of discussing the condition or drug with 
one’s primary care physician, the advertisement suggests that the 
drug’s website will allow one to easily find a doctor, presumably affili-
ated with the drug sponsor, who is more likely to prescribe the 
drug.
262
 
Searching the website for the “Find a Doctor” link reveals the 
following statement: “While any doctor can prescribe LATISSE®, 
some may be more familiar with it than others. When making an ap-
pointment, be sure to say that you want to find out more about 
LATISSE®.”
263
  Clearly, the advertising campaign (including the 
commercial and the website) is branding the disease, promoting not 
just awareness of the condition but the existence and availability of 
doctors who will essentially push the drug.  The question is whether it 
is outrageous conduct to convince the viewer that the viewer has in-
adequate eyelashes (especially in relation to the eyelash models’ ex-
quisitely long and lush lashes) and is in need of pharmaceutical 
treatment.  In another version, the commercial ends with Claire 
Danes proclaiming that Latisse is “from Allergan, a company with six-
 
 258 Latisse Brooke Shields Commercial, supra note 92. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Find a Doctor, LATISSE, http://www.latisse.com/FindaDoctor.aspx?state=18 (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
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ty years of eye-care expertise.”
264
  This clearly intends to add legitima-
cy to the product because the company’s history of eye-care experi-
ence should quell any doubts a consumer might have about the com-
pany’s ability to manufacture this product. 
Critics’ analysis of these commercials is fundamentally flawed.  
The Consumer Report AdWatch analyzes the fine-print of the com-
mercial and explains that Latisse is “[f]or inadequate or not enough 
lashes, also known as hypotrichosis.”
265
  The report states, “[I]n order 
to get FDA approval, a drug must be used to diagnose, prevent, treat, 
or cure a disease.”
266
  As discussed above, one of the definitions of 
“drug” in the FD&C Act is an article “intended to affect the structure 
or any function of the body of man.”
267
  Thus, whether hypotrichosis 
is a disease is irrelevant;
268
 as long as Latisse is intended to affect the 
structure of the eyelash, it is a drug and can be FDA-approved if it is 
safe and effective for this intended use.  Nevertheless, this disease-
branding strategy utilizes the hypotrichosis terminology in order to 
medicalize what could be considered a normal condition.  Due to the 
fact that the diagnosis is subjective (the meaning of “not enough eye-
lashes” is unclear), patients are more comfortable discussing their 
feelings of inadequacy with their doctors because it seems more real 
when it is a medical condition with an FDA-approved prescription 
treatment. 
Finally, a fibromyalgia public service announcement, ostensibly 
sponsored by the National Fibromyalgia Association (but co-
sponsored by Pfizer, the maker of a fibromyalgia drug), demonstrates 
the full extent of a disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign.  
Although it appears to be a help-seeking ad,
269
 the public service an-
nouncement directs the consumer to a website sponsored by Pfizer, 
 
 264 Latisse—“When Your Lashes Grow, Your Lashes Show” (feat. Claire Danes), YOUTUBE 
(July 7, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ1_CQD1jS8. 
 265 CR AdWatch: Latisse, CONSUMER REPS., http://bcove.me/3cn3q2sx (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2011). 
 266 Id. 
 267 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006). 
 268 Regardless, according to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9-
CM) diagnosis 374.55, eyelash hypotrichosis is the “condition of having inadequate 
or not enough eyelashes.” AM. OPTOMETRIC ASS’N CLINICAL CARE GRP., BULLETIN NO. 
4, 1 (2009), available at http://www.aoa.org/documents/Latisse-Bulletin-March-18-
2009.pdf.  
 269 For a discussion of the types of DTC advertisements, see supra notes 96–98 and 
accompanying text. 
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which contains a link to Pfizer’s Lyrica website.
270
  Thus, this help-
seeking ad seems to be a disguised product-claim ad and seems inex-
tricably linked to a DTC drug advertisement, that is, the Lyrica web-
site.
271
  This example is evidence of the scope of Pfizer’s disease-
branding and drug-mongering campaign for fibroymyalgia and 
Lyrica. 
The public service announcement begins with a quick cut to pa-
tients in visible distress, with tears streaming down their faces, lament-
ing the intense and inexplicable pain they experience.
272
  The voiceo-
ver begins, “[I]magine feeling this kind of pain and nobody knows 
what it is or believes you even have it.”
273
  It continues, “This is fi-
bromyalgia, very real widespread pain and tenderness that affects mil-
lions. . . .  There is hope, there is help.  If you’re suffering, talk to 
your doctor and visit fibrohope.org.”
274
  After quickly browsing the 
website,
275
 one can find a link to “Explore a Fibromyalgia Prescription 
Treatment Option,” which takes the consumer to “a product-branded 
Web site from Pfizer” referring to Lyrica.  Thus, while the commercial 
and the website are seemingly designed to raise disease awareness, 
they are inextricably linked to the prescription drug.
276
 
 
 270 Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117.  Lyrica is the first FDA-
approved drug to treat FMS.  FDA News Release, FDA Approves First Drug for Treat-
ing Fibromyalgia (June 21, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108936.htm.  
 271 It should be noted that    
[w]hen done properly, help-seeking ads are not considered to be drug 
ads. Therefore, [FDA] do[es] not regulate true help-seeking ads, but 
the FTC does regulate them.  If an ad recommends or suggests the use 
of a specific drug, however, it is considered a product claim ad that 
must comply with FDA rules. 
Basics of Drug Ads, supra note 96. 
 272 Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117. 
 273 Id.; see also Berenson, supra note 127. 
Fibromyalgia is a real disease. Or so says Pfizer in a new television ad-
vertising campaign for Lyrica, the first medicine approved to treat the 
pain condition, whose very existence is questioned by some doctors. . . .  
Many of its sufferers are afflicted by other similarly nebulous condi-
tions, like irritable bowel syndrome.  
Id. 
 274 Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117. 
 275 Although the link for www.fibrohope.org at the end of the commercial no 
longer exists, the first link on a Google search of “fibromyalgia and Pfizer” reveals 
www.fibrocenter.com, which leads to a similar website.  See FIBROCENTER, 
http://www.fibrocenter.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 276 It is possible that this promotion is misbranded.  See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMIN., supra note 156, at 6 (“If a disease awareness or help-seeking piece and a re-
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As demonstrated by these examples, disease-branding and drug-
mongering in the form of DTC advertising intend to make consum-
ers believe that they suffer from serious medical conditions.  Conse-
quently, there seems to be sufficient evidence to conclude that DTC 
advertising campaigns could constitute outrageous conduct. 
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress(NIED) 
If the iatrogenic effects from taking the medication are consid-
ered,
277
 then a plaintiff may have a successful argument for the physi-
cal impact or injury necessary to establish a prima facie case of 
NIED.
278
  There is no recovery in tort for NIED unless the plaintiff 
falls within a recovery-permitting category; the relevant category for 
the test case is emotional harm that accompanies a physical impact or 
injury.
279
  Thus, the law permits a plaintiff to recover for emotional 
distress when the plaintiff sustains a physical injury that results from a 
defendant’s negligence.
280
 
In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, the plaintiff ar-
gued that he suffered severe emotional distress from fear of develop-
ing cancer after he was negligently exposed to excessive amounts of 
asbestos.
281
  The physical contact with asbestos did not amount to 
physical impact sufficient for an NIED claim because the plaintiff was 
 
minder advertisement are presented in a manner that causes their messages to be 
linked together by the audience, the failure of the combined communication to in-
clude the risk [information] . . . would cause the advertised product to be misbrand-
ed.”). 
 277 Dr. Jutel explains the dangers of iatrogenic effects as follows: 
The expansion of diagnostic categories is not without risk and can have 
severe iatrogenic results.  The concordant treatment which accompa-
nies a diagnosis may expose an individual to undesirable, or unintend-
ed, secondary effects.  The medicalisation of shyness which results in 
the diagnoses of Social Phobia, Social Anxiety Disorder and Avoidant 
Personality Disorder, as one example, encourages patients to request, 
and doctors to recommend, the use of pharmaceutical remedies, some 
of which have led to reports of devastating side effects. 
Jutel, supra note 43, at 286. 
 278 The side effects would be insufficient for a products liability claim, so this 
cause of action is not considered in this Comment.  Moreover, the argument is not 
related to the product itself because the plaintiff would not be alleging a failure to 
warn, design defect, or manufacturing defect.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998).   
 279 Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 430 (1997). 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at 427.  Although Buckley arose under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, 
the Court relied on common-law tort principles, see id. at 429, thus making the analy-
sis relevant and applicable for our test case.   
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asymptomatic.
282
  In addition, the Supreme Court explained that a 
“‘physical impact’ . . . does not include a simple physical contact with 
a substance that might cause a disease at a substantially later time—
where that substance, or related circumstance, threatens no harm 
other than that disease-related risk.”
283
  Accordingly, the rule gleaned 
from Buckley is that the mere exposure to deleterious substances or 
the possible risk of developing a disease are insufficient for an NIED 
claim; rather, some sort of actual physical injury is required. 
In Michtavi, the court noted that under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA), a prisoner-plaintiff must suffer “less-than-significant-but-
more-than-de minimis physical injury” before a civil action can be 
brought for mental distress.
284
  The plaintiff did not allege that the 
prison officials physically harmed him; rather, the plaintiff merely al-
leged that the prison officials were negligent in allowing fellow in-
mates to succeed in their schemes to defraud him.
285
  Thus, the court 
concluded that the FTCA claim failed because “the fact that [plain-
tiff’s] mental condition is treated with medication does not mean 
these emotional problems are physical injury. . . . [T]he fact that [the 
plaintiff] physically takes medication, or that the medication works 
on his physical body, does not mean that the medication is treating 
physical injury.”
286
 
Although taking medication for emotional problems does not 
mean that the medication is treating a physical injury, the iatrogenic 
effects of the treatment may result in physical injury.  This distinction 
is relevant to remove the test case from the Michtavi rule.  Thus, alt-
hough the plaintiff in this Comment’s test case is not taking the drug 
for emotional distress, a physical injury may arise as an unintended 
consequence (side effect) of the pharmaceutical treatment.  Accord-
ingly, the physical effect of the drug could become, in essence, the 
physical impact element for the cause of action. 
 
 282 Id. at 432. 
 283 Id. at 430. 
 284 Michtavi v. United States, No. 4:07-CV-0628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at 
*12 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2009), aff’d, 345 F. App’x. 727 (3d Cir. 2009).  Although this 
case arose under the FTCA, the court applied the substantive law of the state where 
the act occurred.  Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).  Thus, the discussion of a 
physical-injury requirement is analogous to the test case for NIED because it explains 
that receiving pharmaceutical treatment for a mental disorder does not establish that 
the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury.   
 285 Michtavi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *14-15.  
 286 Id. at *15. 
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But in Pennsylvania, for example, a plaintiff alleging an NIED 
claim “must suffer immediate and substantial physical harm.”
287
  In the 
test case, this contemporaneous element is missing because the phys-
ical impact of the side effect occurs after the plaintiff experiences 
emotional distress upon being subjected to the disease-branding and 
drug-mongering campaign.  Logically, a second bout of emotional 
distress could accompany the physical symptoms of suffering from 
side effects, but this would remove the analysis from the disease-
branding and drug-mongering scenario.  Because the second bout of 
emotional distress would be proximately caused by the side effects, 
the claim arising in this case would be an emotional distress claim ac-
companying a products-liability case.
288
  Thus, to correctly isolate and 
define disease-branding and drug-mongering as the causative factors, 
one has to assume that the initial bout of emotional distress was prox-
imately caused by, and directly preceded by, the advertising cam-
paign.  But if this were the case, then the physical injury element 
necessary for the NIED claim could not be satisfied due to lack of 
contemporaneousness: the emotional distress would have preceded 
the physical injury, which is caused by the drug’s side effects.  There-
fore, it seems that an NIED cause of action would likely fail. 
Furthermore, the “learned intermediary doctrine” might provide 
a defense to pharmaceutical company liability.  According to this doc-
trine, which almost every jurisdiction has adopted,
289
 pharmaceutical 
companies have a duty to warn the physician, rather than the con-
sumer as the end user, of a prescription drug’s side effects through 
adequate labeling.
290
  If the warning is adequate, then the drug com-
pany essentially delegates its duty to warn to the physician and shields 
itself from liability.
291
 
 
 287 Doe v. Phila. Cmty. Health Alts. AIDS Task Force, 745 A.2d 25, 28 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2000). 
 288 See supra note 278 (discussing a product liability claim). 
 289 See Garbutt & Hofmann, supra note 84, at 273.  But see Perez v. Wyeth Labs. 
Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (refusing to shield drug companies from liability 
based on the “learned intermediary doctrine” in the context of mass-marketed drugs 
through DTC advertising). 
 290 Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-
Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998). 
 291 See, e.g., Pustejovsky v. PLIVA, Inc., 623 F.3d 271, 276 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Under 
the doctrine, the manufacturer may rely on the doctor—the learned intermediary—
to pass on its warnings.  Thus, so long as the drug manufacturer properly warns a 
prescribing physician of the dangerous propensities of its product, the manufacturer 
is excused from warning each patient who receives the drug.”). 
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But New Jersey, for example, does not apply the learned inter-
mediary doctrine to drug companies when they engage in mass-
marketing of drugs because the premises on which the doctrine relies 
are absent in the DTC advertising context.
292
  In Perez v. Wyeth Labora-
tories Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the learned in-
termediary doctrine will not apply when a prescription drug manu-
facturer uses DTC advertising to market its drug;
293
 instead, drug 
companies have a duty to warn patients directly and cannot rely on 
the prescribing physician’s knowledge and position of authority to 
convey warnings.  Essentially, the court explained that “[w]hen mass 
marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence a patient’s choice 
of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes direct claims to 
consumers . . . should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to pro-
vide proper warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product.”
294
 
Although Perez concerns a failure-to-warn claim, the fact that the 
learned intermediary doctrine may not apply to DTC advertising is 
relevant to an NIED claim based on disease-branding and drug-
mongering.  In New Jersey, the learned intermediary doctrine would 
probably not apply to a claim for NIED premised on disease-branding 
and drug-mongering; however, in any other jurisdiction, the doctrine 
would most likely shield drug companies from liability.
295
 
Furthermore, the element of “physical impact” in the NIED con-
text raises an interesting and troublesome question as to the proper 
defendant.  The drug company’s disease-branding and drug-
mongering caused the emotional distress and the drug caused the in-
jury, but the company was not negligent in providing the plaintiff 
with the injury-causing drug.  Thus, in the test case, it seems that the 
 
 292 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.  
 293 Id. at 1257; see also In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. 
Supp. 2d 795, 811–12 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (analyzing Perez).  See generally Garbutt & 
Hofmann, supra note 84, at 273. (“[DTC advertising] essentially bypasses the ‘inter-
mediary’ . . . .  Thus, the role of the physician . . . is greatly diminished and pharma-
ceutical companies should not be able to benefit from the learned intermediary doc-
trine.”). 
 294 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1247.  
 295 New Jersey seems to be the only jurisdiction to recognize a DTC-advertising 
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine.  See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. 
Supp. 2d 1360, 1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“While the Perez court found that the law 
should be changing in response to changes in marketing strategies by drug manufac-
turers, New Jersey is the only state to have done so.  It is now eight years since Perez 
was decided, and no other state has followed suit.”).  But see Centocor, Inc. v. Hamil-
ton, 310 S.W.3d 476, 508 (Tex. App. 2010) (“[T]he theoretical underpinnings of the 
‘learned intermediary’ doctrine do not apply when a drug manufacturer directly 
markets to its consumers, the patients.”), review granted (Aug. 11, 2011). 
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plaintiff’s emotional distress cannot be attributed to a drug compa-
ny’s negligent conduct.  The drug company is not liable for negli-
gence for the physical injury sustained by the plaintiff because the 
plaintiff autonomously purchased and ingested a drug that the FDA 
approved as safe and effective, and the physical injury (side effect) 
occurred afterward.  Thus, the only potential party whose negligent 
conduct caused a physical injury to the plaintiff would be the treating 
physician.  Consequently, the plaintiff may have an alternative cause 
of action for medical malpractice for wrongful diagnosis or negligent 
prescribing practices. 
3. Medical Malpractice 
A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice premised on a theory of 
negligent diagnosis and treatment must establish four elements: duty, 
breach, causation, and damages.
296
  The breach element may be satis-
fied if the doctor’s “actions demonstrate either a lack of skill or care, 
or failure to give careful and proper attention to his patient.”
297
  Fail-
ure to consider a differential diagnosis
298
 may violate the standard of 
care and establish breach, as it provides evidence of the physician’s 
lack of proper attention to the patient’s case.
299
  This is because 
[a]n incorrect diagnosis of a patient’s condition may produce 
harmful results either by inducing the patient to forgo the proper 
treatment which would have corrected the illness, or by leading 
the defendant to give treatment which is harmful in and of itself, 
aside from the failure to treat the condition with which the plain-
tiff is actually afflicted.
300
 
In Wojton v. United States, for example, the plaintiff alleged four acts 
of negligence against the Veterans Administration for: (1) wrongful 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, (2) wrongful prescribing of schizophrenia 
medication, (3) failure to diagnose PTSD, and (4) failure to prescribe 
 
 296 See 22 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, § 106.02. 
 297 Heimlicher v. Steele, 615 F. Supp. 2d 884, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 298 Differential diagnosis is “[t]he method of distinguishing between two or more 
diseases having similar symptoms by carefully comparing and evaluating the few dis-
similar characteristics and signs, and thus making a final diagnosis.” 2-D ATTORNEYS’ 
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE D-34474 (2009). 
 299 E.g., Trowbridge v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142 (D. Idaho 2010) 
(holding that a doctor breached the standard of care in formulating differential di-
agnoses and treatment plans). 
 300 W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Proximate Cause in Malpractice Cases, 13 A.L.R.2d 11 
(2008). 
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PTSD medication.
301
  Although neither the plaintiff nor the court ad-
dressed these claims in terms of failure to consider a differential di-
agnosis, the diagnostic criteria for these mental disorders suggest that 
the inference is clear.
302
  Misdiagnosing these two disorders is com-
mon due to the subjective experience of hallucinations. 
Analogously, because of the subjective diagnostic criteria of FMS 
and IBS, a medical malpractice claim could arise if the physician neg-
ligently failed to consider the vast array of differential diagnoses for 
these disorders.  A differential diagnosis is critical when evaluating 
FMS because “[t]here are no tests and no combination of symptoms 
and signs that signify without doubt that a patient has fibromyal-
gia.”
303
  Thus, “a number of distinctive disorders may share a few or 
several signs and symptoms with fibromyalgia, sometimes making a 
distinction very difficult.”
304
  For example, hypothyroidism may cause 
fatigue and widespread soft tissue tenderness and thus can masquer-
ade as fibromyalgia.
305
  An article on the differential diagnosis of fi-
bromyalgia notes that 
[t]he multiple symptoms of fibromyalgia often overlap with those 
of related disorders and may further complicate the diagnosis. 
One of the most challenging diagnostic dilemmas that clinicians 
face is distinguishing fibromyalgia from other central pain disor-
ders (e.g., irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome, 
migraine) . . . .  To date, there is no “gold standard” for diagnos-
ing fibromyalgia. Until a better clinical case definition of fibrom-
yalgia exists, all diagnostic criteria should be interpreted with cau-
tion, considered rudimentary, and subject to modification.
306
  
Similarly, “[b]ecause there are usually no physical signs to definitively 
diagnose irritable bowel syndrome, diagnosis is often a process of 
 
 301 199 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 (D. Ohio 2002). 
 302 See DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, at 467 (“Flashbacks in Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder must be distinguished from illusions, hallucinations, and other perceptual 
disturbances that may occur in Schizophrenia . . . .”); 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL. 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9:33 
(2011–12) (noting that flashbacks are the “the PTSD symptoms . . . [that] appear to 
involve a level of reality distortion comparable to that in schizophrenia”). 
 303 David A. Cramer, Fibroymalgia—Clinical Features and Diagnosis, in 6 ATTORNEYS’ 
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 25.30, 25.30 (Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d ed., 
2011). 
 304 Id. at 25.37.  
 305 Id. 
 306 D.L. Goldenberg, Diagnosis and Differential Diagnosis of Fibromyalgia, 122 AM. J. 
MED. (12 Supp.) S14, S14 (2009). 
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elimination.”
307
  Differential diagnoses for IBS include ulcerative coli-
tis, diverticulitis, and Crohn’s disease.
308
  In addition, celiac disease 
and lactose intolerance may cause signs and symptoms similar to 
IBS.
309
 
Thus, one could imagine a cause of action parallel to Wojton for 
FMS or IBS: (1) wrongful diagnosis of FMS or IBS, (2) wrongful pre-
scribing of Lyrica or Zelnorm, (3) failure to diagnose, for example, 
hypothyroidism or Crohn’s disease, and (4) failure to prescribe drugs 
for these conditions.  A patient presenting with gastrointestinal com-
plaints who self-diagnoses as having IBS and seeks a prescription for 
Zelnorm (based on the cumulative impact of a disease-mongering 
campaign), may in fact have a number of other diseases.  If the doc-
tor fails to consider these differential diagnoses, fails to order appro-
priate tests, and thereby wrongfully diagnoses IBS, the doctor may be 
liable for malpractice if the patient suffers adverse reactions to 
Zelnorm. 
Medical malpractice lawsuits could be a weapon against disease-
branding and drug-mongering, but they only work in individual cases 
against individual doctors.  Although individual incidents may be 
remedied through medical malpractice cases, this would not produce 
systemic change in pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of their 
products.  And while successful medical malpractice claims create 
precedent for which other victims of disease-branding and drug-
mongering could rely, this would probably only affect doctors’ diag-
nostic procedures rather than their prescribing habits.  In other 
words, when patients complain of disease-branded symptoms, physi-
cians would be more likely to consider differential diagnoses, rather 
than refuse to prescribe a drug and facilitate the drug-mongering.  
Thus, any attempt to “starve the pharmaceutical beast” by suing doc-
tors in an effort to prevent drug overprescribing would likely fail to 
address the institutionalized practice of DTC advertising central to 
disease-branding and drug-mongering campaigns. 
Ultimately, it seems possible to file a complaint for IIED based 
on the alleged outrageousness of DTC advertising campaigns, and 
 
 307 Irritable Bowel Syndrome—Tests and Diagnoses, MAYO CLINIC (July 29, 2011), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/irritable-bowel-
syndrome/DS00106/DSECTION=tests-and-diagnosis [hereinafter Irritable Bowel Syn-
drome—Tests and Diagnoses]. 
 308 3 ATTORNEYS’ DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE I-62839 (2009); see also Hans Tester, Ul-
cerative Colitis, in 16 ATTORNEYS’ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, supra note 303, at 231.50, 
231.54(3). 
 309 Irritable Bowel Syndrome–Tests and Diagnoses, supra note 307. 
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while the case may reach adjudication on the merits, it seems insuffi-
cient to significantly alter pharmaceutical promotional practices.  In 
addition, an NIED claim would probably fail due to the lack of con-
temporaneousness between emotional distress and injury; also the 
learned intermediary doctrine would pose a formidable defense to an 
NIED case.  Finally, medical malpractice claims seem to be a viable, 
although still insufficient, option that could circuitously influence 
how pharmaceutical companies advertise.  Notwithstanding the po-
tential for establishing precedent, even if a test case is won and af-
firmed on appeal, these litigious retrospective strategies would ulti-
mately be ineffective at producing real, systemic change in disease-
branding and drug-mongering promotional practices.  Therefore, the 
critics of these practices should look to the legislative arena to com-
bat the specific pharmaceutical promotional strategies that they con-
sider particularly egregious and detrimental to public health.  Legis-
lative reform, as a prospective remedy, can address the practices on a 
comprehensive, collaborative, and systemic level, without resorting to 
the expensive, time-consuming, and highly-particularized adversarial 
process. 
C. Legislative Prescriptions for Reform: Understanding and Promoting 
“Academic Detailing” 
  Rather than relying on the inherently retrospective remedy of 
litigation, it is possible to construct prospective policy solutions.
310
  
For example, educating doctors about drug-mongering and disease-
branding, through a process called “academic detailing,” could curb 
the arguably detrimental effects of these advertising practices.
311
  Aca-
demic detailing is the process by which non-profit entities send 
trained healthcare professionals to physicians’ offices to educate 
 
 310 Cf. Lambdin, supra note 240, at 170–71.  
While it may ultimately be out of the hands of the courts and the FDA 
to impose harsher restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising, if the 
public continues to hear statements [warning how DTC marketing has 
led to irresponsible prescribing practices that jeopardize patient safe-
ty], it is highly likely that it will be able to initiate reform on its own, as 
the pendulum of public perception swings from one of acceptance to 
suspicion in the realm of direct-to-consumer advertising. 
Id. 
 311 But see Iona Heath, Combating Disease Mongering: Daunting but Nonetheless Essen-
tial, 3 PLOS MED. 448, 448 (2006), available at 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.00
30146  (“The challenges of combating the current epidemic of disease mongering is 
daunting, and anyone looking for ready solutions should read no further.”). 
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them about drugs and prescribing practices.
312
  Essentially, qualified 
experts, “[u]sing some of the techniques of behavioral science that 
drug reps use, but without the financial incentives of gifts and sam-
ples,” train doctors about drug-treatment options and prescribing 
practices.
313
 
The most important techniques of academic detailing include 
“conducting interviews to investigate baseline knowledge and motiva-
tions for current prescribing patterns . . . [and] establishing credibil-
ity through a respected organizational identity, referencing authorita-
tive and unbiased sources of information, and presenting both sides 
of controversial issues.”
314
  Accordingly, academic detailing “com-
bat[s] pharmaceutical sales reps[’] influence on prescribing, and 
help[s] get doctors the best evidence—without the sales pitch.”
315
  Be-
cause DTC advertising gives consumers increased access to infor-
mation, academic detailing will allow doctors to regain their medical 
authority by becoming knowledgeable about pharmaceutical promo-
tional practices in an effort to combat the effects of DTC advertising 
on patients.
316
 
Doctors should be aware of disease-branding and drug-
mongering.
317
  They “should be wary of exaggerated claims and 
should place the same amount of scrutiny on ads for prescription 
drugs as [they] would on any other advertisement.”
318
  Academic de-
tailing would thus provide physicians with the tools to recognize 
drug-seeking behavior associated with disease-branding and drug-
mongering strategies.  By making doctors aware of these promotional 
 
 312 Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The Case for 
Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 691–92 (2007); 
see also Academic Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt, POSTSCRIPT BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010, 
10:28 AM), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=1254 [hereinafter Academic 
Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt]. 
 313 Poser, supra note 312, at 692. 
 314 Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Principles of Educational Outreach (‘Academic 
Detailing’) to Improve Clinical Decision Making, 263 JAMA 549, 549 (1990). 
 315 Kate Petersen, Academic Detailing Moves Ahead at the State, Federal Level, 
POSTSCRIPT BLOG (Feb. 25, 2010, 10:23 AM), 
http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=1150.  
 316 See Poser, supra note 312, at 692 (“The goal of academic detailing is to coun-
teract the influence of drug reps, improve clinical decision making by physicians, 
and respond to pressure to minimize healthcare costs.”). 
 317 Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 278. 
 318 Ishmeal Bradley, Talk to Your Doctor: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription 
Drugs, Part 3, CLINICAL CORRELATIONS (Aug. 13, 2010, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.clinicalcorrelations.org/?p=2990.   
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practices, and reiterating the importance of differential diagnoses 
and alternative treatment options, academic detailing would be an 
effective tool to combat these practices.  Moreover, open communica-
tion between physicians and patients, both with full knowledge of 
disease-branding and drug-mongering practices, would expose the 
manipulative effects of these practices and allow for more rational 
prescription drug use.  In fact, research suggests that academic detail-
ing is an effective way to counteract the influence of pharmaceutical 
promotional practices and reduce inappropriate prescribing.
319
  For 
example, one study published in the New England Journal of Medi-
cine concluded that “[a]cademically based ‘detailing’ may represent 
a useful and cost-effective way to improve the quality of drug-therapy 
decisions and reduce unnecessary expenditures.”
320
   
Growing interest in academic detailing “is part of a growing 
awareness that pharmaceutical marketing has the potential to inter-
fere with safe prescribing and patient care—and a broader effort to 
make sure it doesn’t.”
321
  The problems associated with drug market-
ing have captured Congress’s attention and inspired it to act.  The 
Independent Drug Education and Outreach Act (IDEA), a bill that 
was introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate but died 
in committee, would have provided “grants or contracts for prescrip-
tion drug education and outreach for healthcare providers and their 
patients.”
322
  The relevant section of the act would have required the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to award contracts to “eligi-
ble entities for the development and implementation of programs to 
appropriately train and deploy healthcare professionals to educate 
physicians and other drug prescribers concerning the relative safety, 
relative effectiveness, and relative cost of prescription drugs and their 
alternatives.”
323
 
The bill was premised on the notion that “[o]ffice calls work.  
That’s why they are the preferred sales tactic of industry.  So it makes 
sense that governments and others who actually foot the cost of pre-
 
 319 See, e.g., Jerry Avorn & Stephen B. Soumerai, Improving Drug-Therapy Decisions 
through Educational Outreach—A Randomized Controlled Trial of Academically Based Detail-
ing, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1457 (1983); M.A. O’Brien et al., Educational Outreach Visits: 
Effects on Professional Practice and Health Care Outcomes, 4 COCHRANE DATABASE SYS. 
REVS. CD000409 (2007); Soumerai & Avorn, supra note 314. 
 320 Avorn & Soumerai, supra note 319, at 1457. 
 321 Academic Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt, supra note 312. 
 322 Independent Drug Education and Outreach Act of 2009 (IDEA), S. 767, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
 323 S.767 § 904(c). 
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scription drugs should adopt the same tactic, albeit with the goal of 
encouraging the use of the best, safest, most cost-effective drugs.”
324
  
Therefore, IDEA should be reintroduced, and ultimately enacted in-
to law, as a prospective remedy for the detrimental effects of disease-
branding and drug-mongering.  The bill could be amended to also 
create advisory committees composed of sociology, marketing, and 
psychology experts to help construct academic-detailing protocols 
and public-health outreach programs.  These protocols and programs 
would facilitate the academic detailer’s role in explaining to doctors 
and patients the power of medicalization—how social forces impact 
the definition of diseases, how disease is thus socially constructed, 
and how medicalization can be influenced by aggressive promotional 
practices.  The advisory committee recommendations could clarify 
the sociology-of-health critique of disease-branding and drug-
mongering, and the increased knowledge of these phenomena would 
yield a stronger defense arsenal for both prescribing physicians and 
patients. 
Ultimately, this legislative prescription would not alter the FDA’s 
regulatory authority over DTC advertising and would leave the FD&C 
Act and associated regulations intact,
325
 but would provide an alterna-
tive educational method of combating the deleterious effects of oth-
erwise-legal advertising and promotional practices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The problems of disease-branding and drug-mongering have be-
come rampant in our society, though at this juncture it is uncontest-
ed that they do not, as a general matter, violate any existing laws.  
These phenomena have surfaced as a result of relatively relaxed FDA 
regulation of DTC advertising.  Drug companies have recognized the 
utility of socially constructing diseases and have employed this tech-
nique into effective advertising practices.  It might be possible to 
bring a cause of action against drug companies and, somewhat deriv-
atively, against prescribing physicians for these practices, but it seems 
that the most likely way to effect change in this area of law would be 
through legislation and education. 
The likelihood of success for an IIED claim is improbable, and 
an NIED claim would most likely fail for a variety of reasons including 
 
 324 The Next Big IDEA: Prescriber Education, POSTSCRIPT BLOG (July 31, 2008, 1:16 
PM), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=179. 
 325 The bill would amend the Public Health Service Act only by adding additional 
sections.  See S. 767 § 2. 
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the lack of contemporaneousness with distress and injury and the 
learned intermediary doctrine defense.  Furthermore, while medical 
malpractice claims against prescribing physicians for wrongful diag-
nosis might be successful on an individual basis, they would not bring 
about any substantial changes in drug-company advertising practices.  
Thus, critics of disease-branding and drug-mongering seem to be left 
without an effective legal remedy, and any such remedy would cer-
tainly not lead to, or result in, overhaul in a way that legislation 
could. 
Therefore, because the promotional practices are legal and gen-
erally do not rise to the level of tortious conduct, critics of disease-
branding and drug-mongering ought to consider legislative reform 
efforts to address pharmaceutical promotional practices and amelio-
rate their public health effects.  Enhancing physicians’ and consum-
ers’ knowledge would enable them to recognize disease-branding and 
drug-mongering and cope better with the torrent of such practices.  
Instituting academic-detailing programs would combat these practic-
es in a systemic and non-litigious way by counteracting the effects of 
DTC advertising on consumer demand and physician prescribing 
habits. 
Although these promotional practices will probably never go 
away, it is certainly possible for the pharmaceutical industry, the FDA, 
and critics alike to coexist more harmoniously.  If these relevant 
stakeholders were aware of the existing competing economic and 
public-health goals, then educated doctors and consumers could se-
lect which drugs are medically necessary, rather than being persuad-
ed by the industry’s disease-branding and drug-mongering practices. 
 
